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CAN PREEMPTION PROTECT PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION? 
Adam Babich† 
A fundamental goal of the U.S. legal system is for ordinary people 
to have the practical ability to vindicate their rights in court. The right 
to access the judicial system is “one of the highest and most essential 
privileges of citizenship.”1 Further, because “accurate and just results 
are most likely to be obtained through the equal contest of opposed 
interests,” broad access to the courts improves the quality of justice.2 
Institutions that offer free legal services therefore perform a public 
service by expanding access to the legal system—even if their clients’ 
cases are sometimes “in disfavor with the general public” or with 
politicians’ valued constituents.3 
Expanded access to the legal system means that government 
agencies and private companies must pay attention to people they 
could otherwise ignore.4 It results in enforcement of laws that 
otherwise could be violated with impunity. This is a plus in terms of 
good government and the rule of law, but it can annoy powerful 
people who are accustomed to getting their own way.  
One reaction has been for state lawmakers to propose legislation—
referred to here as “de-lawyering” laws—to limit access to legal 
representation.5 The idea is to deny lawyers to people with points of 
                                                                                                                 
† Professor of Law, Tulane University, and Director of the Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic. Thanks to Rebecca Lasoski for her research assistance and to Cheri Babich and Professor 
Oliver Houck for their helpful comments. 
1 Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
2  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27–28 (1981); see also Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary process as the best 
means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of error . . . .”). 
3 Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint 
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1216 (1958) (presenting a statement of the Joint Conference on 
Professional Responsibility, established by the American Bar Association and the Association 
of American Law Schools); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 6 (“[A] 
lawyer should seek improvement of [inter alia] access to the legal system . . . .”). 
4 See Arthur H. Bryant, Op-Ed., Access to Justice at Risk, NAT’L L.J. (D.C.), Mar. 28, 
2005, at 22 (“In America, the courts are the one place where even the poorest, most powerless 
person can hold the richest, most powerful person or corporation accountable.”); see also Judith 
Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 807 (2008) (“The 
function of courts as potentially egalitarian political venues can be seen in the efforts to avoid 
them.”). 
5 See David Luban, Silence! Four Ways the Law Keeps Poor People from Getting Heard 
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view that the legislators’ favored constituents would rather not debate 
on the merits. De-lawyering proposals tend to target providers of free 
legal services, including universities with law school clinics. Lately, 
these proposals have taken the form of a threat to universities: either 
stop helping citizens express their points of view in court or face 
financial retaliation.6 
This article argues that—in the context of environmental law—de-
lawyering legislation would run afoul of the U.S. Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause, which preempts state laws that conflict with 
federal policy.7 This article focuses on the primary purpose and likely 
impact of such de-lawyering bills: to hinder public participation in 
decisions about implementation and enforcement of environmental 
laws. That purpose is squarely at odds with an important goal of 
federal environmental statutes: to enhance ordinary people’s ability to 
make their voices heard about those very issues.8 Because de-
lawyering would conflict with congressional mandates to encourage 
public participation, such laws would be vulnerable to challenge 
under the doctrine of conflict preemption.9 
                                                                                                                 
 
in Court, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2002, at 54, 54 (noting that attacking lawyers is an attempt to 
“win legal arguments not by offering better ones, but by getting rid of the advocates who make 
the arguments for the other side”).  
6 See, e.g., Editorial, A Good Kill, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS., May 24, 2010, at 22 
(noting that Louisiana Senate Bill 549 “would have effectively forced Tulane to decide between 
accepting state money and shutting down its law clinic,” even though the law school “receives 
virtually no public funding”); Editorial, First, They Get Rid of the Law Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 12, 2010, at A24 (“Maryland’s lawmakers [had] been wrestling over a bill that threatened 
the funding of the University of Maryland’s law clinic . . . .”); Elizabeth Amon, School Law 
Clinics Spark Hostility, NAT’L L.J. (D.C.), Apr. 1, 2002, at A5 (reporting that in June 2001, 
Pennsylvania legislators amended the University of Pittsburgh’s appropriations bill “to bar the 
[University’s environmental law] clinic from using government money to fund the clinic”). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Legislative de-lawyering may be illegal for other reasons as 
well. See, e.g., infra note 44 and accompanying text (citing Louisiana’s constitutional guarantee 
of access to the courts); infra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that Louisiana law 
disfavors “special laws”); infra note 147 and accompanying text (noting the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s exclusive authority to regulate legal practice); infra note 149 and accompanying text 
(discussing the limits of the Louisiana legislature’s police power); infra notes 162–65 and 
accompanying text (discussing first amendment issues). 
 8 See, e.g., Clean Water Act §101(e), 33 USC § 1251(e) (2006) (“Public participation in 
the development, revision, and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, 
plan, or program established by the Administrator or any State under this chapter shall be 
provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the States. The Administrator, 
in cooperation with the States, shall develop and publish regulations specifying minimum 
guidelines for public participation in such processes.”). Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act § 7004(b) is almost identical. See 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(1) (2006) (quoted infra in text 
accompanying note 133). 
9 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding that state laws are preempted 
if they “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress”). 
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Part I of the article discusses the role of public participation in the 
regulatory process. Part II provides a history of Louisiana Senate Bill 
549—a failed 2010 attempt to de-lawyer the Tulane Environmental 
Law Clinic’s (TELC’s) clients—and shows that such an attempt to 
stifle legal advocacy is a disreputable tactic. Part III analyzes Senate 
Bill 549 in light of the federal preemption doctrine, demonstrating 
that the bill conflicts with federal policy and that it cannot be justified 
in terms of legitimate state objectives. Part IV shows that bringing a 
preemption claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may enable a prevailing 
plaintiff to recover attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.10 The article 
concludes in Part V that the preemption doctrine is a useful tool in the 
effort to stop de-lawyering of an environmental law clinic’s clients. 
I. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
When Congress mandated opportunities for the public to 
participate in environmental decisionmaking, it opened a wide-
ranging dialogue. Some of the issues involved are relatively cut and 
dried. For example: in a nation governed by the rule of law, industrial 
facilities should comply with their permits.11 When people violate the 
law and contaminate public resources, most people would agree that 
the violators should be held accountable.12 To supplement 
                                                                                                                 
10 Section 1983 provides a remedy for people injured by being deprived of their 
constitutional or statutory rights “under color of” state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 
1988(b) provides for awards of attorney fees to prevailing § 1983 litigants. Id. § 1988(b). 
11 See Mayes v. EPA, No. 3:05-CV-478, 2008 WL 65178, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 
2008) (holding that Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulations “create a continuing 
obligation of compliance”); Sierra Club v. Young Life Campaign, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 
1081 (D. Colo. 2001) (“Young Life has an absolute duty to comply with its [Clean Water Act 
discharge] permit.”); cf. Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 229 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[E]very citizen has a duty to comply with the rule of law.” (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 708–09 (1974))). 
Similarly, administrative agencies should obey legislative mandates, including laws 
governing administrative procedures. See Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, No. 10-1941, 2010 
WL 4116892, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010) (forbidding the U.S. Secretary of the Interior’s 
enforcement of a directive to offshore oil drillers because “[n]otice and comment were required 
by law. The government did not comply, and the NTL-05 is [therefore] of no lawful force or 
effect.”); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 311 F.3d 853, 861 (7th Cir. 2002) (“It is not the EPA’s 
prerogative to disregard statutory limitations on its discretion . . . .”). For some laws, citizen 
litigation is the only realistic enforcement mechanism available. See Maine v. Dep’t of the 
Navy, 702 F. Supp. 322, 338 n.8 (D. Me. 1988) (“At oral argument . . . counsel for the United 
States took the position that the EPA itself had no authority to proceed against the federal 
government.”), vacated on other grounds, 973 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1992); Oliver A. Houck, The 
Secret Opinions of the United States Supreme Court on Leading Cases in Environmental Law, 
Never Before Published!, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 459, 499 (1994) (“[T]he Endangered Species 
Act . . . has no mechanism [to force] federal agency compliance except citizen suits.”). 
12 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975) (“[O]ur 
national experience [shows] that the encouragement of private action to implement public policy 
has been viewed as desirable in a variety of circumstances.”). But see Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 215 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
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government enforcement, Congress empowered “any person” to bring 
enforcement action under many modern antipollution laws, 
effectively deputizing members of the public to act as “private 
attorneys general” to help uphold the rule of law.13 When this type of 
public participation helps identify and prosecute lawbreakers, what 
complaint can there be?14 
Congress also gave ordinary citizens the right to participate in 
public dialogue about more complex, inherently debatable issues. 
Administrative proceedings about whether the government should 
issue particular environmental permits, for instance, can turn on 
difficult questions for which there are no clear, right or wrong 
answers. Here are some examples of issues with which Louisiana 
residents have grappled: 
• Is a proposed industrial facility the right fit for the neighborhood 
in which its proponents seek to build?15 
• Must an historic neighborhood be sacrificed to make way for the 
promise of a new medical complex?16 
                                                                                                                 
 
undesirable and unconstitutional consequence of today’s decision [upholding citizens’ standing 
to sue about Clean Water Act violations] is to place the immense power of suing to enforce the 
public laws in private hands.”). 
13 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997) (“[T]he obvious purpose of the 
[Endangered Species Act’s citizen-suit provision] is to encourage enforcement by so-called 
‘private attorneys general . . . .’”); see also James M. Hecker, The Citizen’s Role in 
Environmental Enforcement: Private Attorney General, Private Citizen, or Both?, NATURAL 
RES. & ENV’T, Spring 1994, at 31, 31 (“Fifteen federal environmental laws contain citizen suit 
provisions. Their basic function is to authorize citizens to enforce the mandatory requirements 
of those laws against any person when the government fails to do so.”). 
14 Actually, some academicians argue that breaking the law is a fine thing, so long as the 
violation is efficient, i.e., the benefits outweigh the costs. See Steven Landsburg, Op-Ed., 
Highway Robbery, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2002, at A22 (“If you’re willing to pay $500 to do 25 
mph in a 20 mph zone, you ought to be speeding.”); cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory 
of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1985) (attempting “to derive the basic 
criminal prohibitions from the concept of efficiency”). But see Richard A. Posner, The 
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1670 (1998) 
(acknowledging that attempts “to make economics a source of moral guidance . . . are doomed 
efforts”); James Grant, Book Review, Price and Punishment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2010, at 
A21 (dismissing “the school of legal thought” that adopts Judge Posner’s description of crime as 
“a class of inefficient acts” as follows: “On Planet Tenure, the Ten Commandments seem to 
have not made much of an inroad”). 
15 See, e.g., Mark Schleifstein, Iron Plant Permits to Fuel Debate, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Dec. 27, 2010, at A1 (reporting that a proposed plant “will employ 150 people at 
an average salary of $75,000” near a grain elevator whose owners “contend[ ] that the air 
pollutants could harm the elevator’s workers and contaminate the grain”); Kate Stevens, DEQ 
Hears Nucor Comments, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Dec. 29, 2010, at 1B (reporting that 
“[m]ore than 100 people filled a St. James Parish Courthouse meeting room . . . to attend a 
public hearing” about the Nucor plant, and that a St. James Parish Economic Development 
Board representative said “‘It’s jobs, jobs and jobs, and that’s what we need,’” while a local 
pastor expressed concern “about the health of the people living near the site”). 
16 See Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres. v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 09-5460, 2010 
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• Will a new levee system improve public safety in southern 
Louisiana or destroy the very wetlands we count on to cut down 
storm surges?17 
• With the southern part of the state at risk from rising sea levels, 
should Louisianans expand use of greenhouse gas emitting fuels, such 
as coal and petroleum coke?18 
• Should the government build a new highway through a 
downtown park in historic Lafayette?19 
• Are the environmental burdens of industrialization shared fairly 
among communities of different racial composition?20 
These are not simple questions and it would be unrealistic to 
expect all well-meaning people to agree about them. 
Why should members of the public have a voice on these types of 
issues at all? The answer lies partly in the U.S. administrative law 
system’s goal to temper the power of unelected bureaucrats in what is 
supposed to be a government “by the people.”21 The U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 
WL 1416729, at *28 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2010) (upholding the federal government’s conclusion 
that tearing down a Mid-City neighborhood in New Orleans to clear a site for a Veterans Affairs 
Medical Center will not have significant environmental impacts). 
17 See Complaint at ¶ 25, Save Our Wetlands v. Terrebonne Levee & Conservation Dist., 
No. 08-2159, 2008 WL 2436265 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 2008) (“On March 13, 2006, sixteen coastal 
scientists and engineers wrote to Governor Blanco to warn that the current proposed project 
plans [for the Morganza to the Gulf Levee] ‘rely on an engineering approach that carries high 
economic, structural and environmental risk, and threatens the sustainability of the very 
ecosystem we are all trying to save.’”). 
18 See Ex Parte Application of Entergy Louisiana, LLC for Approval to Recover the Costs 
of the Little Gypsy Unit 3 Repowering Project in Retail Rates, Including Appropriate 
Ratemaking, and to Cancel the Project at 4, Docket No. U-30192 Phase III (La. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n Oct. 27, 2009), http://lpscstar.louisiana.gov/star/ViewFile.aspx?Id=63cba8f7-d013-
42d4-9dfd-62f7ab7a03bf (seeking approval to cancel conversion of a power plant to burn coal 
because “the Project was no longer expected to produce net benefits to customers”). 
19 See Concerned Citizens Coal. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 330 F. Supp. 2d 787, 800 
(W.D. La. 2004) (upholding the planned location of the highway although “there will be drastic 
changes . . . occasioned by the construction of the interstate”), aff’d per curiam, 134 F. App’x. 
760 (5th Cir. 2005). 
20 See Adam Babich, Environmental Justice in Louisiana, 51 LA. B.J. 90, 91 (2003) 
(“[M]any industrial facilities in Louisiana were built bordering pre-existing communities that 
freed slaves had established on the margins of plantations.”); Robert E. Holden & Tad Bartlett, 
Leaving Communities Behind: The Evolving World of Environmental Justice, 51 LA. B.J. 94, 94 
(2003) (“Some anecdotes but little empirical data support [the] view” that “environmental 
burdens . . . fall disproportionately on minority communities.”). 
21 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 
(2000) (“Since the New Deal . . . administrative law has been defined by the crisis of 
legitimacy . . . . Agencies can claim, after all, only a dubious constitutional lineage—the 
Framers made no explicit provision for them, but instead divided power among the legislative 
and judicial branches and a unitary executive.” (footnote omitted)). The “by the people” quote is 
from Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES 
AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 536, 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed. 1989).  
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Court has recognized that a gap in accountability can arise from 
government by administrative agency: 
Our Constitution was adopted to enable the people to govern 
themselves, through their elected leaders. The growth of the 
Executive Branch, which now wields vast power and touches 
almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it 
may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of 
the people.22 
The ability of ordinary people to comment on and challenge agency 
decisions helps “reintroduce public participation and fairness to 
affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated to 
unrepresentative agencies.”23 
Public participation also helps to assure that the “agency will have 
before it the facts and information relevant to a particular 
administrative problem.”24 For example, one factor that may have 
contributed to the 2010 BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico was the 
lack of public participation in approval of Gulf drilling plans. Permit 
appeals “are sometimes the only way to ferret out and fix problems in 
the government’s voluminous environmental plans.”25 Thus, 
environmental groups’ failure to challenge plans for Gulf drilling 
meant that the federal “Minerals Management Service had little to 
fear if they rubber-stamped oil companies’ plans, even if they 
included claims that now seem ridiculous.”26 
Litigation in this context is not necessarily a struggle between 
good and evil. Nor does it always represent a failure of civilized 
                                                                                                                 
22 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010). 
23 MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Nat’l 
Ass’n of Home Health Agencies v. Schweiker, 690 F.2d 932, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also 
Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the 
Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 529 (1972) (“The cardinal fact that underlies the 
demand for broadened public participation is that governmental agencies rarely respond to 
interests that are not represented in their proceedings. . . . Noneconomic interests or those 
economic interests that are diffuse in character tend to be inadequately represented . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)); Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, 25 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10141, 10141 (1995) (“[O]pportunities for citizen litigation enhance the 
legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking.”). 
24 MCI Telecomms., 57 F.3d at 1141 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Health Agencies, 690 
F.2d at 949); see also Oliver A. Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal 
Protection, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 17 (2007) (noting that the IRS recognized public-interest 
litigation as charity because it provides for representation of “a point of view not represented by 
private economic interests”). 
25 Mike Soraghan, Enviro Groups Ignored Gulf Before BP Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/09/27/27greenwire-enviro-groups-ignored-gulf-
before-bp-disaster-96055.html.  
26 Id.  
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discourse. Instead, it is part of an important dialogue—a process of 
involving affected people in decisions that will shape their futures.27 
It is the legal profession’s job to facilitate that dialogue.28 And law 
school clinics can play an important role in helping the profession 
meet this responsibility.29  
Public participation does not come without a price tag. Especially 
in the context of highly regulated industries, however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that “the expense and annoyance” of 
legal processes “is part of the social burden of living under 
government.”30 Courts take such burdens seriously, and one of the 
ongoing struggles of administrative law is to balance efficiency, 
fairness, and full consideration of relevant facts.31 Reviewing courts 
strive to ensure that judicial review does not become “a forum to 
engage in unjustified obstructionism.”32 Yet courts must also ensure 
that agency decisions are “based on a consideration of the relevant 
factors” and subject to “searching and careful” inquiry—even where 
the “ultimate standard of [judicial] review is a narrow one.”33 
Doubtless, the real-world balance that emerges is less than perfect.34 
But government rarely produces perfect solutions.35 
                                                                                                                 
27 See Resnik, supra note 4, at 806 (“[A]djudication is itself a democratic practice—an 
odd moment in which individuals can oblige others to treat them as equals as they argue—in 
public—about alleged misbehavior and wrongdoing.”). 
28 Lawyers contribute to confusion about their role when they analogize lawsuits—which 
are peaceful dispute-resolution mechanisms—to battle. See, e.g., Bret Rappaport, A Shot Across 
the Bow: How to Write an Effective Demand Letter, 5 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 32, 
33 n.9 (2008) (referencing “the 13 principles set forth in Sun Tzu’s Art of War”); Bennett H. 
Beach, The Fastest Gun in the West: Cowboy Attorney Gerry Spence Mows Down Corporate 
Giants, TIME, Mar. 30, 1981, at 48. But a lawyer’s job is not to vanquish enemies but to achieve 
client goals. If the client’s opponents also achieve their goals, so much the better. 
29 See, e.g., Adam Babich, Illegal Permit? Who Are You Going to Call? Your Local 
Environmental Law Clinic! 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11051, 11051 (2009) (“Law 
school operated environmental law clinics—in addition to training students—can serve a vital 
function by expanding the public’s participation in environmental decisionmaking beyond the 
national precedent-setting cases typically litigated by public-interest law firms.”). 
30 FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980) (quoting Petroleum 
Exploration, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938)). 
31 See, e.g., Roland M. Frye, Jr., Restricted Communications at the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 325–26 (2007) (“[I]nherent conflict between 
efficiency and fairness has existed in American administrative law since at least the 1946 
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).” (footnote omitted)).  
32 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 
(1978).  
33 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).  
34 See Theodore B. Olson, Lay Off Our Judiciary, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2005, at A16 
(“Many disputes are close calls, and the judge’s decision is bound to be unpopular with 
someone. But in this country we accept the decisions of judges, even when we disagree on the 
merits, because the process itself is vastly more important than any individual decision.”).  
35 Cf. Winston S. Churchill, Speech at the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 2 
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897–1963, at 7563, 7566 (Robert Rhodes 
James ed., 1974) (“[I]t has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all 
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II. THE 2010 ATTEMPT TO DE-LAWYER TELC’S CLIENTS 
A. The Lead-Up 
In November 2009, the Louisiana Chemical Association (LCA) 
heralded an attack on Tulane University aimed at de-lawyering 
TELC’s clients. LCA President Dan Borné borrowed rhetoric from 
the world of organized crime to announce that LCA’s goal was to 
“kneecap” Tulane University in retaliation for lawsuits brought by 
TELC’s clients.36 The result was Louisiana Senate Bill 549.37 
Louisiana Senator Robert Adley—the President of Pelican Gas 
Management, Inc., and past-president of ABCO Petroleum 
Corporation38—introduced the bill at LCA’s behest on March 29, 
2010.39 Senate Bill 549 was not the first attempt to de-lawyer TELC’s 
clients or those of other law school clinics.40 It was, however, the first 
legislative attempt to force Tulane University to shut down its 
environmental law clinic.  
LCA made no attempt to hide the source of its frustration: By 
expanding access to the legal system, TELC helps people from 
outside the chemical industry participate in decisions about 
implementation of environmental laws that can affect chemical 
                                                                                                                 
 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time . . . .”).  
36 David Jacobs, Louisiana Chemical Association President: Don’t Fund Tulane, 
BUSINESSREPORT.COM (Nov. 25, 2009), http://businessreport.com/news/2009/nov/25/louisiana-
chemical-association-president-dont-fund. “Kneecapping” is “the terroristic act or practice of 
maiming a person’s knees (as by gunshot).” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
690 (11th ed. 2004). 
37 S. 549, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010). 
38 Senator Robert Adley - District 36, LOUISIANA STATE SENATE, http://senate.legis.state. 
la.us/adley/biography.asp (last visited on Apr. 5, 2011). 
39 Sonia Smith, Bill Could Hobble Louisiana’s Law Clinics, 2THEADVOCATE.COM (May 
10, 2010), http://www.2theadvocate.com/news/oilspill/93290009.html (“Adley said he offered 
his proposal after chemical and oil industry lobbyists complained to him about lawsuits brought 
by the Tulane environmental clinic, including a suit against the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency and state regulators that would require them to enforce clean air regulations in the 
Baton Rouge area.”). At the May 19, 2010 hearing, Borné thanked “Senator Adley for 
introducing the bill on behalf of the business community and others in the state that have been 
sued by clients that are represented by the Tulane environmental law clinic.” Hearing on S.B. 
549 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Consumer Prot. & Int’l Affairs, 2010 Leg. Reg. Sess. 
(La. 2010), [hereinafter La. Sen. Hearing Video], available at http://senate.legis.state.la.us 
/video/2010/May.htm#. 
40 See Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, “Kneecapping” Academic Freedom: Attacks on 
Law School Clinics, 96 ACADEME (Nov.–Dec. 2010) (“More than thirty instances of 
interference in law school clinics have been publicized since the late 1960s”); Adam Babich, 
How the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic Survived the Shintech Controversy and Rule XX 
Revisions: Some Questions and Answers, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11476, 11476 
(2002) (explaining how TELC survived an earlier de-lawyering attempt “as a viable member of 
Louisiana’s legal community”). 
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companies’ bottom lines. Since at least 2004, LCA has published an 
“Economic Development Plan” that condemns TELC.41 By its own 
terms, this plan has a narrow goal—to promote “chemical industry 
retention and growth”—not to advance the State of Louisiana’s 
overall best interests.42 Since at least 2004, LCA’s plan has been to 
stop “the effect that lawsuits which are brought by clients represented 
by TELC have on the economy.”43 
Notably, LCA’s plan does not seek to amend environmental laws 
to restrict public participation or to repeal Louisiana’s constitutional 
guarantee that “[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person shall have 
an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered 
without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in 
his person, property, reputation, or other rights.”44 Instead, LCA 
would leave rights to participate on the books, but hinder people’s 
exercise of these rights by eliminating TELC’s ability to offer free 
legal representation. As far back as 2004, LCA identified its preferred 
strategy: threatening to “eliminate state funding of Tulane 
University.”45 
With Senate Bill 549, LCA and Senator Adley sought to cut 
Tulane University off from an estimated $45 million per year in state 
funds unless the university shut down or crippled TELC.46 LCA 
President Dan Borné explained that the bill was a reaction to “two 
decades of lawsuits filed against chemical companies by clients 
represented by Tulane law clinic students and attorneys.”47 He 
                                                                                                                 
41 Under the heading “Civil Justice Reform,” the 2004 LCA plan stated: “Tulane 
University - publicize the effect that lawsuits brought by clients who are represented by Tulane 
have on the economy and eliminate state funding of Tulane University.” LCA & LCIA Economic 
Development Plan (Jan. 7, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2004 LCA Plan]. 
42 The 8 Point Plan, LOUISIANA CHEM. ASS’N, http://www.lca.org/AM/Template.cfm? 
Section=8_Point_Plan (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter 2010 LCA Plan] (emphasis 
added). Similarly, LCA expressed the overall goal of its 2004 plan as: “Develop a predictable 
business environment that reduces investment risk and is conducive to business retention and 
the creation and growth of innovative chemical companies.” See 2004 LCA Plan, supra note 41. 
43 Under the heading “Make Louisiana Competitive: Reduce Hidden Costs,” the 2010 
LCA Plan says: “Make sure people know the harm Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (TELC) 
has caused. Publicize the effect that lawsuits which are brought by clients represented by TELC 
have on the economy.” 2010 LCA Plan supra note 42; see also 2004 LCA Plan, supra note 41. 
44 LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22. 
45 See 2004 LCA Plan, supra note 41 at 6; Tom Guarisco, An Industry Comes Out 
Swinging: La. Chemical Lobby Targets Red Tape, Taxes and Tulane, GREATER BATON ROUGE 
BUS. REP., Mar. 16, 2004, at 13 (noting that one of the plan’s suggestions is “to cut off Tulane 
from state funding” because the “university’s Environmental Law Clinic routinely represents 
poor families who sue when chemical plant operators try to locate new facilities nearby”). 
46 See Jordan Blum, Industry Targets Law Clinics, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), May 14, 
2010, at A4 (“Tulane currently receives close to $45 million a year from in state funds for 
activities such as endowed professorships, cancer research, sickle cell clinics, medical residency 
training and state psychiatric care services, according to the university.”).  
47 Bill Barrow, Bill Targeting Tulane Clinic Fails: Measure Dies in Senate Committee, 
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claimed that lawsuits filed by TELC’s clients “have cost the state 
thousands of jobs and untold millions of dollars in tax revenue” and 
that TELC “takes credit on its website for preventing hundreds of 
million dollars from coming to Louisiana.”48 Borné argued that 
Tulane University was giving cover to “out-of-state student want-to-
be lawyers and their job-killing lawsuits”49 and that TELC had filed a 
case on behalf of a client which could “make the Environmental 
Protection Agency impose millions of dollars in penalty fees” on 
industry.50 
In the same vein, Senator Adley argued that Tulane is “a billion-
dollar industry that recruits out-of-state kids to come in and sue us.”51 
According to the Senator, he intended the bill to stop the University 
from “biting the hand that feeds it,”52 explaining, “I’m opposed to 
taking taxpayer money and then turning around and suing taxpayers. 
If you’re going to take money from the taxpayers and the 
government, you ought not be able to sue the taxpayers and the 
government.”53 He said the bill was “about ‘sending a message’ that 
Louisiana is open for business and taxpayer dollars should not go to 
institutions hurting economic development.”54 The Senator reportedly 
claimed that TELC “has been ‘overly active’ in bringing frivolous 
lawsuits against the government.”55 He did not, however, provide 
examples of frivolous lawsuits or explain why current laws that 
specify sanctions for frivolous lawsuits are insufficient.56  
                                                                                                                 
 
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 20, 2010, at A2. Borné argued that TELC’s “mission 
seems to be to attack business development . . . in this state.” Id. 
48 Dan Borné, Justice for All, ALLIANCE, Spring 2010, at 12, 14. 
49 Katherine Mangan, Louisiana Bill Would ‘Cripple’ Law-School Clinics, Deans Say, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), May 11, 2010, http://chronicle.com/article/Louisiana-Bill-
Would-Cripple/65480. 
50 Dan S. Borné, Letter to the Editor, La. Needs Rules To Curb Abuse by Law Clinics, 
LAFAYETTE DAILY ADVERTISER, May 16, 2010, available in part at http://www.lanewslink. 
com/archives.php?id=17432. 
51 Barrow, supra note 47, at A2. 
52 Editorial, Beware Curtailing Law School Clinics, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, 
at 6A. 
53 Karen Sloan, Battleground Over Law School Clinics Moves To Louisiana, NAT’L L.J. 
(D.C.), May 3, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202457607971& 
slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1; see also Editorial, supra note 52, at 6A (“‘Don’t take tax money and 
then sue the same people you’re taking money from,’ was Adley's reasoning . . . . [But] 
taxpayers spend millions each year for public defender offices to represent suspects against state 
criminal charges. The aim is to ensure competent counsel regardless of someone's ability to 
pay.”). 
54 See Jordan Blum, Law Clinics Focus of Bill, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Apr. 7, 2010, 
at 1A [hereinafter Blum, Law Clinics Focus of Bill]. 
55 Sloan, supra note 53. 
56 State and federal laws and court rules provide for sanctions when lawyers abuse the 
litigation process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006) (authorizing sanctions against any attorney who 
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B. Drafting Challenges 
The de-lawyering bill presented challenges to its drafters. First, 
despite Senator Adley’s “biting the hand that feeds it” rhetoric, the 
State of Louisiana does not fund TELC. At most, one might allege 
that some insignificant percentage of the approximately $30,000 per 
year in capitation fees that Tulane Law School receives from the state 
contributes to TELC’s budget. A threat to withhold some percentage 
of those fees, however, would hardly be enough to scare a major 
university into destroying a valued part of its curriculum. To make his 
threat realistic, therefore, Senator Adley had to widen it to include 
money that Louisiana pays to Tulane University for “endowed 
professorships, cancer research, sickle cell clinics, medical residency 
training and state psychiatric care services”57—the vast majority of 
which has nothing to do with Tulane Law School and much of which 
pays for direct benefits to the state. This created a credibility problem 
as the Senator continued to assert that his purpose was to prevent 
TELC from “taking public taxpayer money to file suits on any social 
issue or agenda that they may have.”58 
Second, in Louisiana “special laws”—i.e., those that pertain to a 
particular institution (or clinic)59—are more difficult to enact than 
laws of general applicability. The Louisiana Constitution forbids 
some special laws, including those “[c]oncerning any civil or criminal 
actions,” those “[r]egulating labor, trade, [or] manufacturing,” or inter 
alia, “granting to any private corporation, association, or individual 
any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity.”60 Even when 
                                                                                                                 
 
“multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) & 
(c) (providing for sanctions and specifying that an attorney implicitly “certifies” that every filing 
has no “improper purpose,” is “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
[change to existing law],” and has “evidentiary support or . . . will likely have evidentiary 
support after . . . a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery”); LA. CODE 
CIV. P. art. 863(B) & (D) (codifying a Louisiana analogue to FED. R. CIV. P. 11); LA. CODE CIV. 
P. art. 2164 (“The appellate court . . . may award damages for frivolous appeal . . . .”); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2009) (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for 
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law.”). 
57 Jordan Blum, Panel Derails Law Clinic Bill, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), May 20, 
2010, at 1A [hereinafter Blum, Panel Derails Law Clinic Bill]. 
58 See La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
59 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 963 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “special law” as a “law 
that pertains to and affects a particular case, person, place, or thing, as opposed to the general 
public”); see also Huntington Odom, General and Special Laws in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV. 
768, 770 (1956) (A special law “grants privileges to some and denies them to others . . . .”). 
60  LA. CONST. art. 3, § 12(A)(3), (6) & (7). 
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not forbidden, Louisiana courts disfavor special laws and the state 
constitution imposes cumbersome procedures on their enactment.61 
In an effort to craft a law of general applicability, Senate Bill 549’s 
drafter(s) created a blunt instrument that would have gutted most 
litigation clinics in Louisiana. The bill would have forbidden 
clinics—other than those practicing criminal law—from 1) filing “a 
petition, motion, or suit against a government agency;” 2) “seeking 
monetary damages;” or 3) “raising state constitutional challenges in 
state or federal court.”62 It also would have required that all law 
school clinics “be subject to oversight by the House Committee on 
Commerce and the Senate Committee on Commerce, Consumer 
Protection and International Affairs.”63 Senator Adley offered a last 
minute amendment to limit the bill to “environmental law clinics 
public and private” during the May 19, 2010 hearing on the bill 
before the Louisiana Senate Commerce Committee.64 The Committee, 
however, declined to consider that proposal. One committee member 
expressed concerns about the proposed amendment’s even-
handedness, wondering why defendants to environmental lawsuits 
would merit legislative relief but not defendants in divorce cases or 
prosecutors annoyed by motions filed in defense of alleged 
criminals.65 
C. Testimony and Decision 
The May 19, 2010 hearing began with Senator Adley, Borné, and 
Louisiana Oil & Gas Association President Don Briggs sitting 
together at a witness table to argue for the bill.66 They focused their 
presentation on the following points: 
• Adley argued that because Tulane University accepts state 
funding, it is improper for TELC to represent clients who 
challenge the government on “social issues;”67 
                                                                                                                 
61 See id. § 13 (requiring, inter alia, publication of notice of intent before introducing a 
bill to enact a special law); see also Rajnowski v. St. Patrick’s Hosp., 564 So. 2d 671, 679 (La. 
1990) (“Special laws that seek to confer extraordinary benefits or liabilities on specific classes 
of persons are disfavored, because it is presumed that the legislature always bears in mind its 
obligation to treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner.”). 
62 S. 549, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2010). 
63 Id. 
64 See La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
65 Id. (remarks of Daniel Martiny, Louisiana State Sen.). 
66 See Steven Mufson, America's Petro-State, WASH. POST, July 18, 2010, at B1 (“During 
hearings, [LCA]’s president, Dan Borné, sat side by side with the bill’s sponsor, state Sen. 
Robert Adley (R), who also owns Pelican Gas Management.”). Adley testified that he was “not 
ashamed of the people that are sitting around me. They built these schools; they built our roads.” 
La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
67 Adley testified that he was not “in favor of taking public taxpayer money to file suits on 
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• Borné stated that—although he does not “specifically charge” 
that TELC engages in barratry—“academic freedom of the 
classroom is no defense for committing barratry in the 
Courtroom.”68 
• Without providing evidence or examples, Borné claimed that 
lawsuits filed by TELC’s clients have resulted in lost jobs and 
investments;69 
• Briggs complained that when he had a private meeting with a 
Louisiana Supreme Court Justice to object to a lawsuit against 
one of his association’s members, “she pointed out very clearly 
to me that this is an issue that she can’t be involved with and has 
any oversight whatsoever because the lawsuit was filed in a 
federal court and not a state court.”70 
• Adley argued that it is unethical for TELC to recover litigation 
costs and attorney fees in settlements of federal citizen suits;71 
and 
• Both Borné and Adley fell back on generalized resentment of 
Tulane University. Borné argued Tulane University should not 
receive state money while Southern University, a state school, 
                                                                                                                 
 
any social issue or agenda that they may have.” Id. Adley ducked Senator Gautreaux’s question: 
“does it boil down to whether or not they’re using public funds to file these lawsuits.” Id. 
Adley’s non-answer was: “I think the issue is simple. That to the University, they’re receiving 
public funds and part of the things that the University does is file lawsuits against businesses 
and government.” Id. In other words, Adley did not say that TELC’s advocacy of clients is state 
funded, which it is not. 
68 Id.  
69 He stated: “Where businesses have been attacked directly, jobs have been 
lost. . . . Where the attack has centered on DEQ, the permitting time many times has been 
extended so that companies simply look elsewhere to make investments that have to hit that 
window of economic opportunity squarely in order to make a clear return on investment.” Id.; 
see also Blum, Panel Derails Law Clinic Bill, supra note 57 (reporting that Borné argued that 
“[j]obs have been lost”). 
70 La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. Some might be gratified to know that lawsuits 
are not resolved in Louisiana through private meetings between trade association representatives 
and Supreme Court justices. See In re Benge, 2009-1617, pp. 28–29 (La. 11/6/09); 24 So. 3d 
822, 839 (holding that a judge “violated Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to 
decide [a] case on the evidence and testimony presented at trial and further, violated Canon 2A 
by allowing outside influences to dictate her decision in the case”). If a defendant believes that a 
lawsuit is unjustified, the appropriate response is to move the court for dismissal of case, FED. 
R. CIV. P. 12(b); LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 921–34, and/or to seek sanctions, see supra note 56; see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b)(1) (“A request for a court order must be made by motion.”); LA. CODE 
CIV. P. art. 961 (“An application to the court for an order, if not presented in some other 
pleading, shall be by motion which, unless made during trial or hearing or in open court, shall 
be in writing.”).  
71 La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. Adley also introduced testimony by an officer 
of EnerVest Operating, L.L.C., who complained about paying attorney fees. Id.; see also infra 
note 180 for a description of the EnerVest case. 
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faced the possibility of closure due to budget cuts.72 Adley 
complained about the state “giving” $45–47 million to “a private 
school—private not public—at a time while we’re facing budget 
issues.”73  
At the hearing, neither Borné nor Adley came up with any 
evidence to support past assertions that TELC caused the loss of 
thousands of jobs and millions of dollars.74 Apparently, their theory is 
that these things are self-evident—that any insistence on compliance 
with environmental laws necessarily equates to economic damage.75 
Adley also offered no evidence to back up past claims (which he did 
not repeat at the hearing) of “frivolous lawsuits.”76 Borné never 
explained what he meant when, leading up to the hearing, he charged 
that TELC “takes credit on its website for preventing investments and 
jobs from coming to Louisiana.”77 He appears to have simply made 
up that allegation and assumed that if he said it enough times people 
would believe him. 
Borné did discuss his “barratry” allegation, clarifying that he based 
it solely on a 19-year-old article by a now-deceased former Dean of 
Tulane Law School.78 At the hearing, Borné appeared to concede that 
this claim was weak, noting “we recognize that this was published [in 
the Tulane Lawyer] almost twenty years ago,” and cautioning that 
                                                                                                                 
72 Borné concluded his prepared testimony as follows: “The logic of sending forty-seven 
million state dollars to Tulane when we’re talking about shutting down Southern University of 
New Orleans does not work for me and I don’t think it should work for anyone in the Louisiana 
State Senate.” La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
Borné and Adley raised other accusations that they did not develop. Specifically, Borné 
provided a list of defendants and projects that have been the subject of litigation handled by 
TELC, apparently to suggest that these lawsuits affected popular projects and good corporate 
citizens; Adley also argued that TELC was “hiding behind poor people” because it represented 
clients such as Sierra Club; and Adley argued that Tulane donors were among the list of 
defendants that TELC’s clients had sued. Id. 
Borné’s implication that lawyers should not assist clients who are opposed to popular 
projects is contrary to basic principles of the U.S. legal system. See infra note 95 (citing, inter 
alia, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2009)). Further, regardless of Adley’s 
“hiding behind poor people” rhetoric, there is no legitimate state interest in preventing law 
school clinics in private universities from representing public interest organizations such as 
Sierra Club. See In re N.H. Disabilities Rights Ctr., Inc., 541 A.2d 208, 216 (N.H. 1988) 
(Souter, J.) (finding that the state could not justify barring nonprofits from providing “legal 
services to the nonindigent”). I provide a detailed rebuttal of the argument that clinics should 
not represent clients in disputes with university donors in another article. See Adam Babich, 
Controversy, Conflicts, and Law School Clinics, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 469, 474–83, 510–12 
(2011). 
73 See La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
74 See Blum, Law Clinics Focus of Bill, supra note 54. 
75 But see infra note 169 (discussing costs and benefits of environmental regulation). 
76 Sloan, supra note 53. 
77 Borné, supra note 50. 
78 I explained the origin of the “barratry” allegation in Adam Babich, The Apolitical Law 
School Clinic, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 447, 459 n.43 (2005). 
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“that is not what I specifically charge” but asserting that “Tulane has 
never retracted this statement.”79 A more recent issue of the Tulane 
Lawyer, however, states: “The Clinic has never engaged in barratry,” 
which would seem to retract the statement.80 Further, during the late 
1990s the Louisiana Supreme Court conducted an investigation of all 
Louisiana clinics that did not result in any findings of barratry.81 
At the May 19, 2010 hearing, residents of communities that have 
relied on the Clinic overflowed the Senate’s hearing room.82 A broad 
roster of witnesses—from the Louisiana State Bar Association 
President to a fireman from the Paincourtville Volunteer Fire 
Department—signed up to testify in support of the Clinic, although 
not many got the chance to speak. Testimony from Tulane University 
President Scott Cowen reaffirmed Tulane’s commitment to public 
service even in the face of a threatened loss of $45 million in state 
funding. Cowen explained that if Tulane were to shut down its clinics 
to preserve state funding, “we [would] throw under the bus every 
indigent person in this state . . . and say we will not represent you 
because the money is more important. . . . [T]hat is what America is 
not about.”83 Emphasizing the unfairness of seeking “to punish or 
severely limit the rights of individuals and organizations who try to 
enforce regulations and laws,” Cowen did not mince words: “This bill 
creates a black eye, a serious black eye, for any industry that supports 
it. . . . [It is] antithetical to everything that is the foundation of a civil 
society.”84 
The Louisiana Senate Commerce Committee voted unanimously to 
“defer”—i.e., effectively kill—Bill 549.85 
                                                                                                                 
79 See La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
80 Adam Babich, The Apolitical Clinic, TULANE LAW., Spring-Summer 2004, at 12. 
Senator Adley nonetheless revived the barratry charge in a Fall 2010 article for LCA, adding the 
ridiculous (and false) claim that “TELC bragged about committing Barratry . . . on its web-site.” 
Robert Adley, Ambulance Chasing on the Bayou . . . Legal Extortion, ALLIANCE, Fall 2010, at 
33. 
81 In 1997–98, the Louisiana Supreme Court investigated all Louisiana clinics but did not 
report any findings of wrongdoing. Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Bernette J. Johnson stated, 
“[a]n exhaustive review of all Louisiana law clinics failed to uncover any violations of the Law 
Student Practice Rule.” La. Sup. Ct., Resolution Amending and Reenacting Rule XX, (Johnson, 
J., dissenting) (1999) at 1, available at http://www.lasc.org/rules/supreme/xxbjj.PDF; see also 
La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39 (statement of Stephen M. Griffin, former Tulane Law 
School Interim Dean) (arguing that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s investigation should be 
viewed as cutting off earlier allegations of barratry). 
82 See Blum, Panel Derails Law Clinic Bill, supra note 57, at 1A (“Former law clinic 
clients, supporters and opponents filled the state Senate Committee on Commerce, Consumer 
Protection and International Affairs hearing and overflowed into two other rooms.”). 
83  La Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
84 Id. 
85 See John Maginnis, Oil Puts Lawmakers on Slippery Slope, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), June 9, 2010, at B7 (“When the Louisiana Chemical Association pushed its bill 
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D. De-Lawyering Is a Disreputable Tactic 
De-lawyering proponents would sacrifice fundamental values 
underlying our legal system to advance narrow interests of 
constituents.86 The press got this right when reporting on Bill 549: 
“Adley and the LCA were, in effect, thumbing their noses at the law, 
judicial process and regulation—all areas within the purview of the 
Legislature to change.”87 If a legislator disagrees with environmental 
laws, he or she is free to seek their repeal. Similarly, if the legislator 
thinks it is a mistake for environmental laws to empower citizens to 
participate in permitting decisions or sue violators, the legislator is 
free to seek amendment of those provisions. Attempting to repeal 
environmental laws or eliminate the public’s legal standing to sue 
might be unpopular, but it would still be part of a legitimate dialogue 
about social policy. But de-lawyering legislation is an attempt to end-
run that dialogue by silencing opponents and denying them the 
practical ability to vindicate legal rights.88 
Trying to silence people with inconvenient opinions is 
characteristic of a “banana republic” approach to government that is 
contrary to U.S. legal traditions.89 Indeed, our “Pledge of Allegiance” 
does not celebrate “liberty and justice for some,” but for all—even 
people with whom our legislators’ most valued constituents 
disagree.90 The U.S. legal tradition of affording even people we 
disagree with an opportunity to vindicate their rights is at least as old 
as the nation itself.91 More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 
aimed at impeding the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic from suing state agencies or 
businesses on behalf of poor citizens, it experienced the rare sensation, usually reserved for its 
opponents, of being ganged up on in committee and sent packing.”); Barrow, supra note 47, at 
A2 (noting that the outcome was “a rare defeat for the chemical, oil and gas industries.”).  
86 See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-
Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 245 (2003) (“When politics impinges on the 
imperative to hear both sides, the adversary system threatens to dissolve into farce or fraud.”); 
Fuller & Randall, supra note 3, at 1216 (“Under our system of government the process of 
adjudication is surrounded by safeguards evolved from centuries of experience. . . . All of this 
goes for naught if the man with an unpopular cause is unable to find a competent lawyer 
courageous enough to represent him.”). 
87 Editorial, A Good Kill, supra note 6, at 22. 
88 See generally Luban, supra note 86, at 245 (“Silencing doctrines raise the prospect of 
an adversary system in which one set of adversaries . . . is relentlessly squeezed by political 
opponents who would rather muzzle them than argue against them.”). 
89  See supra notes 1–3. 
90 Bryant, supra note 4 (“In the United States of America, we don’t pledge allegiance to 
liberty and justice ‘for some.’ We must keep the courthouse doors open—and preserve access to 
justice— for all.”). 
91 See Peter Elikann, Commentary: Attacks on Detainees’ Lawyers Show Lack of 
Understanding, R. I. LAW. WKLY., March 22, 2010 (“[T]he American tradition of zealous 
representation of unpopular clients is at least as old as John Adams’ representation of the British 
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Court recognized that the right to participate in the legal system “lies 
at the foundation of orderly government.”92 It “is the right 
conservative of all other rights.”93 Imperfect and frustrating as it may 
be, litigation is a dispute resolution mechanism that serves as “the 
alternative of force” and violence.94 
U.S. lawyers live by a code under which one of the “highest 
services the lawyer can render to society” is to represent people with 
unpopular or controversial points of view—even when the lawyer 
does not personally agree with those points of view.95 This is why 
ethical lawyers from both sides of the political spectrum condemned 
political attacks on government lawyers for having formerly 
represented Guantanamo detainees, as well as attacks on a former 
solicitor general for representing supporters of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act.96 The Wall Street Journal editorialized, “To drop a case 
under political pressure is especially unethical.”97 American Bar 
Association President Carolyn Lamm has urged “those who would 
                                                                                                                 
 
soldiers charged in the Boston massacre [in 1770].”) 
92 Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); see also Olson, supra 
note 34, at A16 (“Our courts are essential to an orderly, lawful society.”). 
93 Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148.  
94 Id.; see also Bryant, supra note 4 (“Extremely emotional and heated disputes are 
resolved nonviolently in the courts every day.”). 
95 Fuller & Randall, supra note 3, at 1216; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2009) (“Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable to 
afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval.”); id. 
R. 1.2(b) (“A lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the 
client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.”); id. pmbl. ¶ 1 (“A lawyer, as a 
member of the legal profession, is . . . a public citizen having a special responsibility for the 
quality of justice.”); id. pmbl. ¶ 6 (“A lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the 
administration of justice and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, 
cannot afford adequate legal assistance.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-27 
(1980) (“Regardless of his personal feelings, a lawyer should not decline representation because 
a client or a cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse.”); id. EC 2-28 (“The personal 
preference of a lawyer to avoid adversary alignment against judges, other lawyers, public 
officials, or influential members of the community does not justify his rejection of tendered 
employment.” (footnote omitted)); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal 
Op. 1208 (1972) (“Lawyer-members a governing body of [a] legal aid clinic should seek to 
establish guidelines that encourage, not restrict, acceptance of controversial clients and 
cases . . . ”). 
96 See John Schwartz, Conservatives Split Deeply Over Attacks on Justice Dept. Lawyers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A1 (“Many conservatives, including members of the Federalist 
Society . . . say [the attack] violates the American legal principle that even unpopular defendants 
deserve a lawyer.”); Steve Visser, Lawyers Question Firm’s Withdrawal, ATLANTA J. CONST., 
April 27, 2011, at A3 (“U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder . . . said [Paul] Clement is ‘doing 
that which lawyers do’ by representing the lawmakers [in support of the Defense of Marriage 
Act].”). That act purports, inter alia, to relieve states of the obligation to give full faith and 
credit to proceedings of other states “respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex 
that is treated as a marriage.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
97  Editorial, Knave and Spalding, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2011, at A16.  
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undermine clinical law school programs to step back and remember 
that the rule of law cannot survive if pressure prevents lawyers from 
fulfilling their responsibilities to their clients.”98 The principle that 
everyone deserves a chance to vindicate his or her rights in the legal 
system is too important for legislators to sacrifice for the sake of 
sparing constituents in highly regulated fields the annoyance of 
hearing opposing voices.99 
There is, of course, a huge gap between the principle that every 
citizen should have access to the legal system and the reality of the 
U.S legal-services market.100 Professor Gene R. Nichol has noted that 
more than “eighty percent of the legal need of the poor and the near 
poor—a cohort including at least ninety million Americans—is 
unmet. As a result, these economically marginalized citizens are left 
outside the bounds of the effective use of our adjudicatory systems, 
state and federal.”101 Further, many people who are not poor could not 
afford the legal fees it would take to bring an enforcement action 
against a major corporation or to effectively challenge issuance of a 
permit that might transform the quality of life in a community.102 Just 
because we fall short of living up to our ideals, however, is no reason 
for abandoning those ideals entirely. 
III. FEDERAL LAW WOULD PREEMPT STATE DE-LAWYERING OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CLINICS’ CLIENTS 
A. The Supremacy Clause Preempts State Obstruction  
of a Federal Statutory Purpose 
The Supremacy Clause establishes that the “Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States . . . made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be 
                                                                                                                 
98 First, They Get Rid of the Law Clinics, supra note 6, at A24. 
99 See Luban, supra note 86, at 246 (arguing that steps to combat limitations on access to 
justice “should be regarded as matters of fundamental procedural justice, not partisan politics”); 
Fuller & Randall, supra note 3, at 1162–216 (presenting the Joint Conference on Professional 
Responsibility’s conclusion that lawyers have “an affirmative duty to help shape the growth and 
development of public attitudes toward fair procedures and due process”). 
100 Deborah Rhode & James Sokolove, We Must Do Better, NAT’L L.J. (D.C.), Dec. 22, 
2008, at 23 (“It is a shameful irony that the nation with the world’s largest concentration of 
lawyers does such an abysmal job of making legal assistance available to those who need it 
most.”). 
101 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial Abdication and Equal Access to the Civil Justice System, 
60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325, 327–28 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
102 See Cramton, supra note 23, at 538 (stating, in 1972, that “[p]articipation in a major 
FTC case would probably cost an active intervenor $100,000 or more if the work were not 
handled on a pro bono publico basis”); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE 
AND IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PROFESSIONS 27 (2005) (“[A] wide gap remains 
between the rights available in theory and those available in practice.”). 
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the supreme Law of the Land.”103 Because federal law is paramount, 
it preempts inconsistent state and local law.104 Further, federal 
administrative regulations have “no less pre-emptive effect than 
federal statutes.”105 Preemption jurisprudence is built on two 
fundamental principles. The first is that “the purpose of Congress is 
the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”106 The second is 
that courts begin their analyses with a “presumption against pre-
                                                                                                                 
103 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
104 See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991) (“Under the Supremacy 
Clause, state laws that ‘interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made in pursuance 
of the constitution’ are invalid.” (citation omitted) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824))); Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383–84 (1963) (“‘[T]he law of the 
State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield’ when incompatible 
with federal legislation.” (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211)); see also JAMES T. 
O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW: LEGISLATION, REGULATION AND 
LITIGATION 5 (2006) (“Alexander Hamilton was sadly incorrect when he predicted that ‘it will 
always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities 
than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities.’” (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 17)). 
105 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982)); see also Nina A. Mendelson, 
Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 739 (2004) (“When faced with an agency 
interpretation addressing a statute’s preemptive effect, courts have trod unevenly in reconciling 
Chevron deference with the Rice presumption against preemption.” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984))); see also Ernest A. Young, Executive 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 883 (2008) (arguing that when courts “review an agency’s 
interpretation of a federal statute’s preemptive effect . . . the presumption against preemption 
may conflict with the Chevron rule, which requires courts to defer to agency interpretations of 
the statute”).  
106 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 & n.3 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Scholars tend to be critical of the Court’s approach to determining 
Congress’ purpose. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL 
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 51 (2008) (“[T]he Court has crafted an ornate, and 
often inconsistent, body of law to decide whether Congress has impliedly preempted state 
law.”); David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
507, 510 (2008) (“[I]mplied preemption inquiries ask the federal courts to answer a wholly 
hypothetical question: if Congress had spoken directly and unambiguously to the precise 
preemption question at hand, which it did not, what would it have said?”); Viet D. Dinh, 
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2085 (2000) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s 
numerous preemption cases follow no predictable jurisprudential or analytical pattern.”); S. 
Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 716 
(1991) (“[P]liant standards governing the degree of clarity with which Congress or an agency 
must speak for a rule to be preemptive . . . [lead to a] substitution of judicial policymaking for 
political decision.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 727, 741 (2008) (“[T]he doctrine . . . systematically exaggerates the role of congressional 
intent, attributing to Congress judgments that are in fact grounded in judicial perceptions about 
the desirability of displacing state law in any given area.”); Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in 
Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 515 (2010) (“Judicial preemption doctrine is thin and 
confusing.”); Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-Emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-
Emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1388 (1998) (“[O]nce courts delve 
into the murky realm of congressional purposes to ascertain whether Congress intended to 
displace state law, it naturally follows that courts may overstep the federalism line . . . .”).  
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emption,” i.e., “the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded.”107 
Preemption of state and local laws may occur in one of three 
ways.108 Most obviously, Congress can preempt state law directly, by 
legislative mandate.109 A finding of preemption “is compelled 
whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s 
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”110 Also, 
when Congress occupies an “entire field” with federal law, it 
necessarily preempts state and local laws in that area.111 Finally, 
“even if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is nevertheless 
pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law.”112 
Conflict preemption arises when a state or local law “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.”113 The federal objective must be 
                                                                                                                 
107 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194–95 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485). 
108 But see Merrill, supra note 106, at 739–40 (noting that “the exact number [of 
preemption categories] depend[s] on who is doing the counting” and arguing for four “express, 
field, conflict, and frustration”). Conflict and frustration, however, both fit nicely into the 
“conflict” category.  
109 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989) (“It is accepted that Congress 
has the authority, in exercising its Article I powers, to pre-empt state law.”); see also Bruesewitz 
v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1074–75 (2011) (holding that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act of 1986 “expressly eliminates liability for a vaccine’s unavoidable, adverse side effects,” 
including “those resulting from design defects”).  
110 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); see also Barnett Bank of Marion 
Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1996) (“[When] explicit pre-emption language does 
not . . . directly answer the question . . . courts must consider whether the federal statute’s 
structure and purpose, or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit, 
pre-emptive intent.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
111 See Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (“A federal statute, for example, may create a scheme 
of federal regulation ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the States to supplement it.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230 (1947))). 
112 ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100; see also Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31 (“Alternatively, 
federal law may be in irreconcilable conflict with state law.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
113 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). For example, a state law that weakens a 
federal law’s protections of health and the environment would stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of that act’s purposes and objectives. See Boyes v. Shell Oil 
Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[The Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act] sets a floor for regulation of hazardous waste and to allow the Florida program to restrict or 
limit the federal remedy would lower that floor.” (citation omitted)). 
Courts also note that conflict preemption arises when “compliance with both federal and 
state regulations is a physical impossibility.” See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). But because creation of a physical impossibility would obstruct 
accomplishment of Congress’ full purposes, the “obstruction” test would presumably resolve 
any allegations of impossibility. Cf. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505 
n.4 (2009) (explaining that it is permissible to skip the first part of the Chevron test for statutory 
interpretation in administrative law (i.e., “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue”) and move directly to the test’s second step (i.e., whether the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable) because “if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any 
agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable.”) (citing 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
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“significant.”114 Whether a state attempts to impede such an objective 
by direct regulation or by using its spending power presents “a 
distinction without a difference.”115 Federal statutory policy still 
trumps conflicting state laws.116 Further, neither an express 
preemption provision nor a saving clause in the federal statute at issue 
“bar[s] the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”117 
                                                                                                                 
114 Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1137 (2011) (“Like the 
regulation in Geier [v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)], the [seatbelt] regulation 
here leaves the manufacturer with a choice. And, like the tort suit in Geier, the tort suit here 
would restrict that choice. But unlike Geier, we do not believe here that choice is a significant 
regulatory objective.”).  
115 Wis. Dep’t. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 
(1986); see also id. at 289 (“To uphold the Wisconsin penalty simply because it operates 
through state purchasing decisions therefore would make little sense. . . . [B]y flatly prohibiting 
state purchases from repeat labor law violators Wisconsin simply is not functioning as a private 
purchaser of services; for all practical purposes, Wisconsin’s debarment scheme is tantamount 
to regulation.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
116 See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2411 (2008) (holding that the 
Wagner Act preempts a state law that “prohibits certain employers that receive state funds—
whether by reimbursement, grant, contract, use of state property, or pursuant to a state 
program—from using such funds to assist, promote, or deter union organizing” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
117 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001) (quoting Geier v. 
Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)); see also Geier, 529 U.S. at 870 (“[T]his 
Court has repeatedly ‘decline[d] to give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would 
upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.’” (quoting United States v. 
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000))); New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1248 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (rejecting “[a]n interpretation of the saving clauses” in the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) that “would seriously 
disrupt CERCLA’s principle aim of cleaning up hazardous waste”). But see Cipollone v. Liggett 
Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (“Congress’ enactment of a provision defining the pre-
emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.”); 
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of 
the pre-emptive reach of a statute ‘implies’—i.e., supports a reasonable inference—that 
Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely 
forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 
658, 664 (1993) (“If the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory 
construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which 
necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.”). See generally Sandi 
Zellmer, When Congress Goes Unheard: Savings Clauses’ Rocky Judicial Reception, in 
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 
144, 144 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (“Preemption is particularly troublesome when 
Congress has included a savings clause in the federal statute at issue.”).  
Savings clauses in environmental laws are typically addressed to regulation of pollution, 
not public participation. For example, Clean Water Act § 510 protects state authority to “adopt 
or enforce” standards “respecting discharges of pollutants” and “requirement[s] respecting 
control or abatement of pollution” so long the state rules are not “less stringent” than federal 
law. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006). Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3009 expressly 
preempts “any requirements less stringent than those authorized under this subchapter” and 
preserves state authority to impose “any requirements, including those for site selection, which 
are more stringent than those imposed by such [federal] regulations.” 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006). 
Clean Air Act § 116 provides that the Act does not “preclude or deny the right of any 
State . . . to adopt or enforce . . . any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air 
pollutants” unless the standard is “less stringent” than a standard that is effective under federal 
law. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006). 
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Even state laws “designed to protect vital state interests” are 
subject to preemption.118 Nonetheless, Supremacy Clause doctrine 
contains ample room for consideration of state legislative purposes.119 
This is largely because the presumption against preemption’s impact 
can vary with the nature of the state interest involved.120 The 
presumption has particular force in fields that have traditionally been 
the states’ province.121 In Wyeth v. Levine—a 2009 case holding that 
federal Food and Drug Administration labeling requirements did not 
preempt a state-law failure-to-warn claim—the Supreme Court 
clarified that the presumption does not depend on a recent tradition of 
state primacy in the regulatory area at issue.122 Instead: 
[The Court relies] on the presumption because respect for the 
States as “independent sovereigns in our federal system” 
leads us to assume that “Congress does not cavalierly pre-
empt state-law causes of action.” The presumption thus 
                                                                                                                 
118 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976); see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 
107, 120 (1994) (“[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, [the Court’s] office is not to pass judgment 
on the reasonableness of state policy.” (citation omitted)); Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. 
Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (“‘[A]ny state law, however clearly within a State’s 
acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’ We 
therefore reject petitioner’s argument that the State’s interest in licensing various occupations 
can save [state regulation of workplace safety] from OSH Act pre-emption. . . .” (citations 
omitted) (quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988))); Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766 (1982) (“[I]t has always been the law that state 
legislative and judicial decisionmakers must give preclusive effect to federal enactments 
concerning nongovernmental activity, no matter what the strength of the competing local 
interests.”). 
119 See Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 518 (1989) 
(“Where state law impacts on matters within FERC’s control, the State’s purpose must be to 
regulate production or other subjects of state jurisdiction, and the means chosen must at least 
plausibly be related to matters of legitimate state concern.”). In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court 
analyzed the relative strength of the state and federal interests at issue, noting that the legislation 
at issue was “in a field which affects international relations” and that the state’s power was “not 
bottomed on the same broad base as is its power to tax.” 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941); see also 
Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Parish of Saint James, 775 F.2d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 1985) (“At the 
very least, an exercise of legislative rulemaking authority must be a reasonable means of 
attaining legitimate governmental objectives. Here, of course, the question is . . . whether [the 
challenged ordinance] trenches impermissibly upon a field preempted by Congress. 
Nevertheless, the two analyses are related.” (citations omitted)). 
120 See, e.g., Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 (“[A]n ‘assumption’ of nonpre-emption is not 
triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant 
federal presence”). 
121 See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663–64 (1993) (“[A] court 
interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be 
reluctant to find pre-emption.”). 
122 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009) (rejecting the argument that the 
presumption should not apply “because the Federal Government has regulated drug labeling for 
more than a century”). 
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accounts for the historic presence of state law but does not 
rely on the absence of federal regulation.123 
In general, presumptions are strange and unpredictable things.124 
Sometimes they merely assign the burden of producing evidence to 
the disfavored party but do not affect the burden of proof.125 This is 
the “bursting bubble” presumption that, once rebutted, vanishes and 
no longer affects the outcome.126 If that was what the presumption 
against preemption were about, it would not be very significant.127 
Other presumptions, however, change the burden of persuasion.128 
Still others behave like a thumb on the scale of justice, serving 
throughout the lawsuit to add a vague persuasive force to the favored 
party’s evidence.129 The nature and effect of the presumption against 
preemption in this regard remains unclear.130 
Whether there is a presumption or not, of course, state law “must 
yield” if the Court finds that it is “incompatible with federal 
legislation.”131 Whether a particular obstacle is “sufficient” to trigger 
                                                                                                                 
123 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). 
124 See D. Craig Lewis, Should the Bubble Always Burst? The Need for a Different 
Treatment of Presumptions Under IRE 301, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 5, 5 (1995) (“Scholars, courts, 
and legislators have disagreed for decades about how the law of evidence should deal with legal 
presumptions, a question that remains challenging.”). 
125 See FED. R. EVID. 301 (“[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
directed the burden of going forward with evidence . . . but does not shift to such party the 
burden of proof . . . .”); see also A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 
1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[A] presumption . . . completely vanishes upon the introduction of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact.”); Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 902 F.2d 795, 802 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Once 
the party against whom the presumption operates produces evidence challenging the presumed 
fact . . . the presumption bursts and is eliminated from the analysis.”). 
126 MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 821 (Edward W. Clearly ed., 2d 
ed. 1972) (These presumptions are “like bats of the law flitting in the twilight, but disappearing 
in the sunshine of actual facts.” (quoting Mackowik v. Kan. City, St. James & Council Bluffs 
R.R. Co., 94 S.W. 256, 262 (Mo. 1906))). 
127 But see Merrill, supra note 106, at 728 (arguing that the “presumption, if consistently 
applied, would also shift authority for making preemption decisions from the courts to 
Congress”). 
128 See, e.g., Fischer v. S/Y Neraida, 508 F.3d 586, 595 (11th Cir. 2007) (describing a 
presumption as “‘strong’ in the sense of imposing a burden of persuasion upon the defendant, 
and not just a burden of production or of going forward”). 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[E]ven 
after a defendant has introduced some evidence to rebut the flight presumption, the presumption 
does not disappear, but rather retains evidentiary weight—the amount depending on how closely 
defendant’s case resembles the congressional paradigm—to be considered along with all the 
other relevant factors.” (citation omitted)). 
130 See Hoke, supra note 106, at 733 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to its 
presumptions as “fickle”). 
131 Sperry v. Fla., 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“[E]ven if Congress has not occupied the field, state 
law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute.”). 
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preemption, however, “is a matter of judgment, to be informed by 
examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose 
and intended effects.”132 
B. De-Lawyering Is an Obstacle to Accomplishment  
of Congress’ Purpose 
Under the “conflict preemption” doctrine, the argument that 
federal law would have preempted Louisiana Senate Bill 549 is not a 
difficult sell. Major federal environmental laws unambiguously 
mandate that states facilitate public participation. The following 
language from the federal hazardous waste statute—known as the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act—is almost identical to 
language in the Clean Water Act: 
Public participation in the development, revision, 
implementation, and enforcement of any regulation, 
guideline, information, or program under this chapter shall be 
provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator 
and the States. The Administrator, in cooperation with the 
States, shall develop and publish minimum guidelines for 
public participation in such processes.133 
Senator Adley designed his bill as “an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution” of that congressional mandate.134 
This is because Senator Adley’s proposal was for Louisiana to do the 
exact opposite of encouraging and assisting public participation. 
Louisiana Senate Bill 549 would have discouraged public 
participation by de-lawyering law clinics’ clients. The purpose was to 
“send[ ] a message that Louisiana is open for business” by sending a 
message that public opposition would be restricted.135 The fact that 
Bill 549 relied primarily on conditions attached to state spending 
would not have saved the bill because “it is not permissible for a State 
to use its spending power to advance an interest that . . . frustrates [a] 
comprehensive federal scheme.”136 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
132 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (noting 
that there is no “rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the 
meaning and purpose of every act of Congress”).  
133 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7004(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(1)  
(2006) (emphasis added); Clean Water Act § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (2006) (quoted supra 
note 8). 
134 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67.  
135 See Blum, Law Clinics Focus of Bill, supra note 54, at 1A (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
136 Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (2008).  
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has ruled, analogously, that “a state rule predicating benefits on 
refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law poses special 
dangers of interference with congressional purpose.”137 For a state to 
confer benefits only on those universities that forgo rights under 
federal law would have a “direct tendency to frustrate the purpose of 
Congress and, if not pre-empted, would defeat or handicap a valid 
national objective.”138 
Not only was Bill 549 intended to stand as an obstacle to 
Congress’ purpose, the bill’s de-lawyering approach—if enacted and 
upheld—would have been an effective obstacle.139 Meaningful 
participation by the public in government administration of regulatory 
laws is not possible without the practical ability to litigate. EPA has 
recognized that “[w]hen citizens are denied the opportunity to 
challenge executive decisions in court, their ability to influence 
permitting decisions through other required elements of public 
participation, such as through public comments and public hearings 
on proposed permits, may be seriously compromised.”140 The U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
137 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 116 (1994) (emphasis added). The benefit at issue 
in Livadas was state enforcement of a penalty claim for an employer’s refusal to pay wages 
promptly upon discharge. Id. at 110. 
138 Id. (quoting Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
139 See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 105 (1992) (“In assessing 
the impact of a state law on the federal scheme, we have refused to rely solely on the 
legislature’s professed purpose and have looked as well to the effects of the law.”). But see Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 216 (1983) 
(accepting “California’s avowed economic purpose” for enacting a law that halted construction 
of nuclear energy plants and holding, therefore, that “the statute lies outside the occupied field 
of nuclear safety regulation” (emphasis added)). Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., however, involved 
field preemption, not conflict preemption. See id. The case distinguished Perez v. Campbell, 402 
U.S. 637(1971). See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 216 n.28. Perez had involved “an actual 
conflict between state and federal law.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 216 n. 28. See Perez, 
402 U.S. at 651–52 (“We can no longer adhere to the aberrational doctrine . . . that state law 
may frustrate the operation of federal law as long as the state legislature in passing its law had 
some purpose in mind other than one of frustration.”). In contrast, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 
“Congress ha[d] left sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear power 
to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons.” 461 U.S. at 223; see also Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1440–41 (2010) (rejecting the 
approach of evaluating “conflict based on the subjective intentions of the state legislature” 
because under that approach “one State's statute could survive pre-emption . . . while another 
State's identical law would not, merely because its authors had different aspirations”); Silkwood 
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249 (1984) (“[R]eview of the same legislative history 
which prompted our holding in Pacific Gas & Electric, coupled with an examination of 
Congress’ actions with respect to other portions of the Atomic Energy Act, convinces us that the 
pre-empted field does not extend as far as Kerr-McGee would have it.”); Christopher H. 
Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 117, at 
119, 133 (Pacific Gas and Electric . . . is exemplary in comprehending that while Congress 
surely has objectives for statutes when it enacts them, it may well not want those objectives 
pursued ‘at all costs.’”). 
140 Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 880 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting EPA’s Preamble to 
Proposed Rule: Amendment to Requirements for Authorized State Permit Programs Under 
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained, “[t]he comment of 
an ordinary citizen carries more weight if officials know that the 
citizen has the power to seek judicial review of any administrative 
decision harming him.”141 Further, without legal assistance, access to 
the courts is nearly always meaningless.142 
The clear mandates of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act and the Clean Water Act provide the most powerful bases for a 
preemption attack on a bill like 549. It is difficult to imagine how a 
de-lawyering bill that targeted an environmental law clinic could 
survive a conflict with federal hazardous waste and clean water laws, 
since a large percentage of such a clinic’s docket is likely to involve 
programs under these statutes. Plaintiffs may nonetheless wish to base 
additional arguments for preemption on other federal environmental 
laws, which use different language, to establish federal policy that 
favors participation of the public in environmental decisions.143 For 
example, the Clean Air Act requires that state’s permit programs 
provide for “public notice, including offering an opportunity for 
public comment and a hearing, and for expeditious review of permit 
actions . . . including an opportunity for judicial review.”144 This is 
                                                                                                                 
 
Section 402 of the Clean Water Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 14588, 14589 (Mar. 17, 1995)). 
141 Id. 
142 See Nichol, supra note 101 at 345-46; Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 
(1981) (noting that if one side to a dispute is unrepresented by counsel “the contest of interests 
may become unwholesomely unequal”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) 
(“[L]awyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice . . . .”). 
143 Congress’ unambiguous determination that public participation serves the public 
interest is analogous to its decision allowing workers a relatively free hand in labor disputes. In 
that context, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that “[f]or a state to impinge on the area of labor 
combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were 
to [authorize picketing] for purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits.” Garner v. 
Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953). But see Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the 
Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in Labor-Management Relations Policy, 19 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 120 (2009) (arguing that “much federal labor law preemption 
doctrine ignores [the] general principle of the broader law of preemption” that a “‘clear and 
manifest’ or ‘clear and unambiguous’ indication of congressional intent [is required] to preempt 
state law”).  
144 Clean Air Act § 502(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) (2006); see also id. § 160(5), 42 
U.S.C. § 7470(5) (2006) (stating that Part C of the Clean Air Act’s purpose is “to assure that any 
decision to permit increased air pollution in any area [that already meets federal standards] is 
made only . . . after adequate procedural opportunities for informed public participation in the 
decisionmaking process”). See also Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 102, 30 
U.S.C. § 1202 (2006) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to . . . assure that appropriate procedures 
are provided for the public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of 
regulations, standards, reclamation plans, or programs established by the Secretary or any State 
under this chapter . . . .”); Coastal Zone Management Act § 306, 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(14) (2006) 
(“Before approving a management program submitted by a coastal state, the Secretary shall find 
[that the] . . . program provides for public participation in permitting processes, consistency 
determinations, and other similar decisions.”). 
A claim that the Coastal Zone Management Act preempted a state’s failure to “allow for 
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part of a statutory scheme in which “Congress made clear that citizen 
groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather 
as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental 
interests.”145 
C. De-Lawyering Fails to Rationally Advance State Interests 
Given the potential for the state’s interest to affect the presence 
and strength of the presumption against preemption, it is worth 
establishing that Senate Bill 549 had no reasonable relationship to a 
legitimate state purpose. States, of course, have “a substantial interest 
in regulating the practice of law” within their borders.146 In Louisiana, 
however, the state Supreme Court “has exclusive and plenary power 
to define and regulate all facets of the practice of law.”147 Senator 
Adley, therefore, could not have been invoking the state’s authority 
over the bar. Instead, as an attempt to shield a favored constituency 
from the risks of litigation, Bill 549 must have been based on the 
state’s general police power. 
The Louisiana Legislature’s police power is broad.148 It is not, 
however, unlimited. The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that 
the police power only extends to “reasonable” measures: 
A measure taken under the state’s police power is reasonable 
when the action is, under all the circumstances, reasonably 
necessary and designed to accomplish a purpose properly 
falling within the scope of the police power. Thus, to sustain 
                                                                                                                 
 
public participation before authorizing the private construction of wind farms” was 
unsuccessful, in part because “nothing in the Act expressly requires Texas to provide for public 
participation and consistency reviews in wind farm construction.” Coastal Habitat Alliance v. 
Patterson, 385 F. App’x 358, 360–61 (5th Cir. 2010). That case, however, did not concern a de-
lawyering effort and did not involve a mandate that public participation “shall be provided for, 
encouraged, and assisted by . . . the States.” See supra note 8 (quoting Clean Water Act 
§ 101(e)) and note 133 (quoting Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7004(b)). 
145 Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976). 
146 Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963); see also Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 
U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (“States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within 
their boundaries, and . . . as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other 
valid interests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and 
regulating the practice of professions.”); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 273 (1957) 
(“We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own bars, but it is equally 
important that the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in 
such way as to impinge on the freedom of political expression or association.”). 
147 Succession of Wallace, 574 So. 2d 348, 350 (La. 1991) (emphasis added). 
148 See Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1993) (“The powers of the United 
States Congress are specifically delineated in the United States Constitution. Conversely, the 
Louisiana Legislature, as with the legislatures of the other states of the Union, has all powers 
which have not been denied it by the state constitution.”). 
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an action under the state’s police power, courts must be able 
to see that its operation tends in some degree to prevent an 
offense or evil or otherwise to preserve public health, safety, 
welfare or morals. Further, an exercise of the state’s police 
power “does not justify an interference with constitutional 
rights which is entirely out of proportion to any benefit 
redounding to the public.”149 
So the question is whether Senator Adley’s de-lawyering bill would 
have tended “in some degree” to “preserve public health, safety, 
welfare or morals” and whether any purported benefit was “out of 
proportion” to the bill’s interference with Louisiana’s constitutional 
guarantee of open access to justice.150 
None of Senator Adley’s stated purposes for Senate Bill 549 offer 
a reasonable prospect for public benefit. First, his “[d]on’t take tax 
money and then sue the same people you’re taking money from”151 
argument is inconsistent with state policy and, as he would apply the 
argument, is unlawful under first amendment doctrine.152 The State of 
Louisiana—like many states—provides money and other subsidies to 
a host of recipients. For example, on October 21, 2010, “State 
officials unanimously agreed . . . to give Nucor Corp. $30 million 
toward building an iron facility in St. James Parish.”153 In 2009, the 
state “pitch[ed] in $50 million” to help California-based Foster Farms 
buy and renovate a chicken plant in Farmerville, Louisiana, and 
                                                                                                                 
149 Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 15 2000-1132 (La. 4/3/01), 785 So. 2d 1 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted) (quoting City of Baton Rouge v. Williams, 95-0308, p. 6 (La. 
10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 445, 449). 
150 LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; see Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 310 (La. 1986) (“The 
constitutional guarantee providing for open courts and insuring a remedy for injuries does not 
warrant a remedy for every single injury; it applies only to those injuries that constitute 
violations of established law which the courts can properly recognize.”); cf. Ryland v. Shapiro, 
708 F.2d 967, 971–72 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the “right of access to the courts is basic to 
our system of government, and it is well established today that it is one of the fundamental 
rights protected by the Constitution” and that “Courts have required that the access be 
‘adequate, effective, and meaningful’” (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977))). 
151 Editorial, supra note 52. 
152 A brief discussion of these first amendment issues appears infra, at notes 162–65 and 
accompanying text. 
153 Michelle Millhollon, State Officials Approve Nucor Funding, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, 
La.), Oct. 21, 2010, at A6; Robert Travis Scott, Local Projects Are Cut to Make Room for 
Nucor, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 22, 2010, at A4 (“The State Bond 
Commission . . . removed $22 million worth of projects from the state’s construction budget to 
make way for an incentive package for a Nucor Corp. iron plant near Convent.”). The state has 
also agreed to pay the New Orleans Hornets, a basketball team, “subsidies which kick in 
whenever the team does not meet certain annual revenue benchmarks.” Associated Press, Gov. 
Jindal Anticipates La. Payment to Hornets, WASHINGONTIMES.COM, (Mar. 15, 2011, 4:27 AM), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/15/gov-jindal-anticipates-la-payment-to-
hornets/print.  
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“agreed to spend up to $37 million in state economic development 
funds” on a ConAgra Foods sweet potato facility in Delhi, 
Louisiana.154 Other than direct appropriations, state subsidies to 
qualifying businesses include the Industrial Ad Valorem Tax 
Exemption Program (a ten-year abatement of local property taxes on 
qualifying investments),155 Film Production Transferable Tax 
Credits,156 and the Enterprise Zone Program,157 among others.158 
Can you imagine what would happen if a legislator introduced a 
bill to prohibit all recipients of these subsidies from 1) filing “a 
petition, motion, or suit against a government agency,” 2) “seeking 
monetary damages,” or 3) “raising state constitutional challenges in 
state or federal court”?159 There are no such restrictions on industrial 
recipients of Louisiana’s largess.160 In fact, the state itself is not shy 
about simultaneously accepting federal subsidies and suing federal 
agencies.161 Senator Adley has offered no justification for applying 
his “biting the hand” principle to require universities to give up—as a 
price for doing business with the state—privileges enjoyed by other 
                                                                                                                 
154 Gary Perilloux, Efforts to Grow La. Economy Keep State Officials Busy, ADVOC. 
(Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 3, 2010, at F1; Michelle Millhollon, Officials Agree to Funding for 
Fries, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 29, 2009, at B6; Michelle Millhollon, Lawmakers will 
Spend Megafund, Funds Go to Chicken, NASA Plants, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), May 14, 
2009, at A9.  
155 See LA. CONST. art. VII, pt. II, § 21(F); see also Robinson v. Ieyoub, 97-2204, p. 5 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 12/28/98); 727 So. 2d 579, 582 (limiting the exemption to facilities that “meet the 
definition of a manufacturing establishment”); Oliver A. Houck, This Side of Heresy: 
Conditioning Louisiana’s Ten-Year Industrial Tax Exemption upon Compliance with 
Environmental Laws, 61 TUL. L. REV. 289, 292 (1986) (arguing that the “ten-year industrial tax 
exemption is the closest thing to a sacred cow in Louisiana” (footnote omitted)). 
156 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007(C)(5) (2009) (“Any motion picture tax credits not 
previously claimed by any taxpayer against its income tax may be transferred or sold to another 
Louisiana taxpayer or to the office, subject to the following conditions . . . .”). 
157 See id. § 51:1781–1791 (providing, inter alia, for tax rebates on qualifying investments 
in enterprise zones). 
158 See Jan Moller, Critics Blast La. Tax Breaks, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), 
Nov. 19, 2010, at A3 (reporting that Louisiana loses “more than $7 billion a year in potential 
revenue” due to “more than 300 exemptions to Louisiana's sales and income-tax laws”). 
159 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (quoting Senate Bill 549). 
160 See, e.g., Bunge N. Am., Inc. v. Bd. of Commerce & Indus. & La. Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 
2007-1746 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/08), 991 So. 2d 511, 516–17 (noting that the recipient of an 
Industrial Ad Valorem Tax Exemption “filed suit against the Board and the Department seeking 
a declaratory judgment of its rights under the contract and challenging the Board and/or the 
Department’s ability to restrict, alter, or modify the terms of the contract [granting the 
exemption]”). 
161 For example, Louisiana has joined a court challenge to federal health-care legislation. 
See Complaint at 3, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. 
Mar. 23, 2010). Yet Louisiana receives millions in federal subsidies. See Jonathan Tilove and 
Bruce Alpert, GOP Group’s Cuts Would Hit La., TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 21, 
2011, at A1 (reporting on suggested federal budget cuts that would, inter alia, “cost Louisiana 
up to $200 million in Medicaid financing for the first six months of 2011”). 
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Louisiana residents, without imposing the same rule on others who 
receive taxpayer dollars. 
Further, legislation that conditions government benefits on the 
sacrifice of first amendment rights is problematic under the U.S. 
Constitution.162 When a government is actually funding the program it 
seeks to regulate, the government may have a say in how that 
program’s directors spend government money.163 Even that principle 
is limited when the government seeks to undercut the independence 
of lawyers with private clients.164 In any event, the State of Louisiana 
does not fund TELC, and cannot lawfully exercise control over 
TELC’s advocacy by imposing conditions on the funding of other 
university programs.165  
Second, Adley’s argument that TELC has behaved unethically by 
recovering attorney fees in settlements of environmental cases is 
demonstrably wrong. Courts award attorney fees under environmental 
                                                                                                                 
162 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no 
‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit . . . [the Government] may not deny a benefit to a 
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest 
in freedom of speech.”); see also Nicole B. Cásarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and 
Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 502 (2000) (“The First 
Amendment becomes implicated when the government attempts to restrict private speech as part 
of its benefit package.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1506 (1989) (arguing that the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine . . . guards 
against . . . government overreaching[,] . . . bars redistribution of constitutional rights as to 
which government has obligations of evenhandedness[,] . . . [and] prevents inappropriate 
hierarchy among rightholders”). 
163 See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Rust declined to apply Perry 
where “the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that 
public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.” Id. at 196. The Rust 
Court upheld regulations that “do not force the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related 
speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct from Title 
X activities.” Id. Also, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), the Court held that 
“[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities 
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen” because it 
“simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created.” Id. at 421–22; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First 
Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 44 (2008) (“[W]hen the 
government hires personnel to speak for it, the government is entitled to regulate the content and 
even the viewpoint reflected in such speech.”). 
164 See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (overturning a law 
prohibiting Legal Services Corporation lawyers from raising constitutional challenges to state or 
federal laws because, inter alia, “the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression 
upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power”); id. at 542 
(“[T]here is an ‘assumption that counsel will be free of state control.’” (quoting Polk Cnty. v. 
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1981))). 
165 See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 77–78 (1990) (“What the First 
Amendment precludes the government from commanding directly, it also precludes the 
government from accomplishing indirectly.”). Borné made the nature of the threat clear in his 
testimony: “Nothing in this bill would prohibit the law clinic from doing exactly what it’s doing 
today, nothing, but the university would then have to fund all of those services that it gets 
money from the state for now.” La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
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laws because federal and state laws provide specifically for such 
awards.166 Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court rule that governs 
student practice confirms that law clinics may “be awarded attorney’s 
fees and costs for the services rendered by the student attorney and 
supervising attorney in those cases where the awarding of attorney’s 
fees and costs is provided by statute.”167 The American Bar 
Association’s model ethical rules for the legal profession make it 
clear that attorneys may recover statutory attorney fees in pro bono 
cases.168 
Third, Adley and Borné have never offered evidence to support 
their assertion that TELC’s advocacy harms the state by causing the 
loss of jobs and investments. In fact, many scholars believe that, on 
balance, environmental protection is good for economic 
development.169 Further, the evidence is strong that adherence to the 
                                                                                                                 
166 See Adam Babich, The Wages of Sin: The Violator-Pays Rule for Environmental 
Citizen Suits, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 219, 248 (2003) (“To encourage citizens to file 
environmental enforcement suits . . . Congress needed to provide a practical way for citizens to 
pay lawyers. Thus, . . . Congress authorized citizen enforcers to seek recovery of their 
reasonable litigation costs, including attorney fees, from violators of environmental laws.”); see 
also Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2026A(3) (2000) (“The 
court . . . may award costs of court including reasonable attorneys and expert witness fees to the 
prevailing party.”). 
167 LA. SUP. CT. R. XX § 3(a). 
168 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 6.1 cmt. 4 (“[T]he award of statutory 
attorneys’ fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from 
inclusion under this section.”). 
169 See Lisa P. Jackson, The EPA Turns 40, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2010, at A17 (arguing that 
“the last 40 years show no evidence that environmental protection hinders economic growth” 
and that environmental regulations have “sparked a home-grown environmental protection 
industry that employs more than 1.5 million Americans”). The EPA has analyzed the costs and 
benefits of regulation under the Clean Air Act and concluded that from 1970 to 1990 benefits 
exceeded costs “by a factor of 10 to 100 times.” EPA-410-R-99-001, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990 TO 2010 1 (1999). For the 1990 to 2010 period, the agency 
projected that benefits would exceed costs “by a factor of four to one.” Id. at 105. EPA’s benefit 
calculation included avoiding more than $ 4 billion in reduced worker productivity and $ 3.9 
billion in reduced agricultural yields due to effects of ground level ozone. See id. at 97.  
Professor David M. Driesen argues that “empirical literature shows that environmental 
regulations . . . have caused a small net increase, not a decrease, in jobs.” David M. Driesen, The 
Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 573 (1997) (footnote omitted); see also Sanford E. Gaines, Rethinking 
Environmental Protection, Competitiveness, and International Trade, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
231, 288 (1997) (“The facts show a solid basis for a convergence of interests, rather than a 
conflict, between strong environmental protection efforts and competitive economic 
development.”). Professor Richard B. Stewart disagrees, arguing that “stringent environmental 
regulation and liability rules may harm . . . international competitiveness, even though most 
empirical studies have not established a strong causal association between the two.” Richard B. 
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 
2041 (1993). Professor Stewart warns that “questions about the relation between environmental 
standards, international competition, and welfare are laden with uncertainties.” Id. at 2105. 
Professors Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling illustrate the limitations of cost-benefit 
analysis by describing a tobacco industry-funded study which relied on “conventional cost-
benefit analysis” to find that “smoking was a financial boon for the [Czech Republic 
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rule of law is a better strategy for sustained economic growth than 
attempting to shortcut the law to benefit favored industries.170 
Borné has argued that because TELC represents clients who 
participate in permit proceedings, “the permitting time many times 
has been extended so that companies simply look elsewhere” and 
“this type of activity . . . helps to prove the point that we have one of 
the most inhospitable legal climates in the nation.”171 But the process 
for judicial review of Louisiana permits is remarkably streamlined 
and rarely suspends the effectiveness of permits.172 Further, a 2010 
study “ranked Louisiana ninth among U.S. states for its business 
climate.”173 Louisiana’s “executive survey rank” was seventh174—a 
                                                                                                                 
 
government]—partly because . . . it caused citizens to die earlier and thus reduced government 
expenditure on pensions, housing, and health care.” Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, 
Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1553, 1553–54 (2002) (footnote omitted); see also Editorial, Obama’s Rule-Making Loophole, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2011, at A16 (complaining that cost-benefit analyses which include 
consideration of “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts’ will create a “values 
loophole” that “boils down to a preference for bigger government” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
170 See Olson, supra note 34, at A16 (“[A] robust and productive economy depends upon a 
consistent, predictable, evenhanded, and respected rule of law.”); John N. Drobak, A Comment 
on Privatization and Democratization, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 784 (2006) (“One of the 
reasons that the rule of law is so important is its protection of competition in both economic and 
political markets. With a regime of laws, not people, with transparent and predictable rules, 
everyone has the opportunity to compete on a level playing field (putting aside wealth 
disparities).”). 
171 See La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39. 
172 Permit appeals are “devolutive,” rather than “suspensive” and, thus, do not normally 
delay permit issuance. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2050.21(A), 49:964(C). But see, e.g., id. 
§ 30:2050.22(B) (providing that “the secretary may grant, or the court may order, a stay with 
appropriate terms”); Div. of Admin. v. Dep’t of Civil Serv., 345 So.2d 67 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1976) 
(discussing the standard for stays). Citizens have only thirty to sixty days to appeal most 
environmental permits after the agency provides notice of their issuance. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 30:12(A)(2) (most Department of Natural Resources appeals - sixty days), 30:2050.21(A) 
(most Department of Environmental Quality appeals - thirty days), 49:964(B) (Louisiana 
Administrative Procedure Act - thirty days); see also In re Natural Res. Recovery, Inc., 1998-
2917 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/18/00), 752 So. 2d 369 (discussing the requirements for notice of 
issuance). The law generally confines review to the administrative record. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 30:12(B)(4), 49:964(F) (incorporated by id. § 30:2050.21(F)). The agency usually has either 
thirty or sixty days to transmit the record to the court. Id. §§ 30:12(B)(2) (thirty days), 
30:2050.21.D (sixty days), 49:964(D) (thirty days). For Department of Environmental Quality 
permit appeals, the law requires a court ruling by ninety days after filing of the administrative 
record. Id. § 30:2050.21(G); In re. Westlake Petrochemicals Corp., 99-1726 (La. App. 1 Cir. 
11/3/2000), 769 So. 2d 1278 (analyzing the ninety-day requirement). The courts employ a 
relatively deferential standard of review. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:12(B)(5), 49:964(G) 
(incorporated by id. § 30:2050.21(F)). Louisiana law provides tight deadlines for most 
administrative permit decisions. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:26, 30:2022(B)(2), 
30:2022(C), 49:214.30(C)(2), 56:6(26). 
173 Business Climate Ranked, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), NOV 3, 2010, at C6 
(Louisiana’s Economic Development Secretary credited the results in large part to “recent 
economic competitiveness improvements in Louisiana, such as business tax cuts, governmental 
ethics reform, the creation of Louisiana FastStart and our focus on business retention and 
 2/1/2011 2:50:49 PM 
2011] CAN PREEMPTION PROTECT PUBLIC PARTICIPATION? 1141 
remarkable achievement considering publicity about hurricane risks. 
According to the study’s survey of corporate real estate executives, 
the key factors in site selection are: “1) work force skills, 2) state and 
local tax scheme, 3) transportation infrastructure, 4) flexibility of 
incentive programs, 5) & 6) availability of incentives and utility 
infrastructure, 7) land/building costs and supply, 8) state economic 
development strategy, 9) permitting and regulatory structure, and 
10) higher education resources.”175 
Even if Adley and Borné’s unsubstantiated claims of economic 
damage were taken seriously, de-lawyering lower-income Louisiana 
residents would not be a responsible reaction. If environmental laws 
are excessively stringent, or public participation rights are too 
extensive, the appropriate response is to amend those laws, not to 
deny lawyers to people seeking to vindicate rights that the law grants 
them.176 
In addition, harming a major university would not be a reasonable 
response to fears about losing jobs or investments. Tulane University 
President Cowen explained that Tulane is “the largest private 
employer in Orleans Parish and one of the largest in the state. . . . To 
think that anyone would advocate damaging one of the largest 
employers in the state, that is an anti-economic development agenda 
if I’ve ever seen one.”177 Putting aside the importance of Tulane as an 
employer, educational institutions are important drivers of economic 
development. Damaging the curriculum and reputation of a major 
university would be an irrational approach to improving the 
economy.178 
                                                                                                                 
 
expansion, as well as our enhanced focus on small business development.”). The rankings are 
based on “a survey of site selection consultants and corporate executives who make location 
decisions for major business investment projects” and on “quantitative measures linked to a 
database of new and expanded business activity.” Id.  
174 Mark Arend, One Piece at a Time, 55 SITE SELECTION 830, 831 (2010). 
175 Id. at 835 (numbering format and capitalization style modified) (numbers 5 and 6 were 
tied). A serious attempt to improve the hospitality of Louisiana’s legal climate would 
presumably address the fact that Louisiana is the only state that has failed to adopt Article II of 
the Uniform Commercial Code. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A 
Commemorative Essay, 78 TUL. L. REV. 379, 400-01 (2003) (“The enactment of all but one of 
the articles of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . was a critical moment in Louisiana's legal 
history. . . . What is missing now is the adoption of article 2 of the U.C.C. that governs sales of 
goods.”). 
176 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (quoting NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS’ 
statement that “Adley and the LCA were, in effect, thumbing their noses at the law, judicial 
process and regulation—all areas within the purview of the Legislature to change.” Editorial, A 
Good Kill, supra note 6, at 22). 
177 Sonia Smith, Tulane Is Targeted by Lobbying Group: Environmental Law Clinic Under 
Attack, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 15, 2010, at A2. 
178 See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Budget (2009), 111th Cong. 4 (testimony of Peter 
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After the defeat of his bill, Senator Adley published an article in 
LCA’s trade magazine that makes new and wildly inaccurate 
allegations about TELC.179 None of these new allegations hold water, 
however, and none establish a legitimate state interest in de-lawyering 
TELC’s clients.180 
                                                                                                                 
 
R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget) (“If we do not invest in education and clean 
energy, our prospects for long-term economic growth will be diminished.”), http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/testimony/031009_budget.pdf; U.S. CONG., JOINT 
ECONOMIC COMM., INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC RETURNS, at abstract 
(Jan. 2000) (“There is a strong consensus among economists that formal education is an 
important determinant of individual earnings as well as economic growth.”), http://www. 
house.gov/jec/educ.pdf. 
179 Adley, supra note 80. 
180 Adley claims without basis that “over one third of the cases filed by TELC have been 
deemed frivolous and a waste of time and resources by the courts.” Adley, supra note 80 at 33. 
But he has not come up with a single example of such a case. He also claims that “[a] quick look 
at the donors list provided by Tulane shows companies that were sued by Tulane and have now 
magically become financial supporters.” Id. at 34. But TELC never accepts or even discusses 
contributions to Tulane University as part of the settlement of a case. 
In his article, Adley recounts a phony story in which TELC supposedly sued a company 
that had already “completed [a cleanup] in accordance with law”—“running up legal costs 
needlessly” and saying “it would drop the law suit ‘only’ if the company would pay a settlement 
to Tulane.” Id. at 34. Adley’s story would be shocking if it were true, but it is not. Adley claims 
his story is “a summary of testimony before the Louisiana legislature.” Id. Instead, his account 
distorts the testimony by the only representative of a private company who testified at the May 
19, 2010 hearing—Bill Page, a Vice President of EnerVest Operating, L.L.C. To show that 
Adley’s allegations are wrong, the remainder of this footnote contrasts those allegations with 
Bill Page’s testimony and with the facts of the EnerVest case. 
The case was about mercury contamination in Louisiana’s Union, Ouachita, and 
Morehouse parishes. The state had issued warnings about “unacceptable levels” of mercury in 
the area. La. Dep’t of Health & Hospitals, News Release: Mercury and Fish Advisories Issued 
for 10 Waterways (May 29, 2003) (on file with author). Mercury is a neurotoxin, and a listed 
hazardous waste. See Preamble to Proposed Rule: National Emission Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants, 67 Fed. Reg. 44672, 44672 (July 3, 2002); 40 C.F.R. § 261.33(f) (2010) (waste 
code U151). Some gas producers nonetheless allow mercury to leak onto soils and wetlands 
from outdated meters that measure pressure in gas pipelines. One of these producers, EnerVest, 
owned more than 400 mercury meters in the Monroe Gas Field. 
Adley claims that EnerVest “found mercury contamination and notified [the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ)] for guidance and supervision” and “notified 
TELC so that it could be satisfied the law was being followed.” Adley, supra note 80, at 34. 
EnerVest’s Bill Page testified, however, that EnerVest began purchasing mercury-meter sites in 
the Monroe Gas Field in 1998 and he made no claim to have notified LDEQ before 2006—eight 
years later—or to have notified TELC at all. La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39 (asserting 
that “EnerVest initiated discussions with the Louisiana DEQ in 2006 to work out a cooperative 
agreement”). A search of LDEQ records does not reveal any EnerVest notification to LDEQ 
until after TELC’s clients sent EnerVest a demand letter in December 2006. See LDEQ 
Electronic Document Management System (EDMS) (search under Agency Interest No. 
149272—the first EnerVest letter on point is dated Feb. 21, 2007). 
On December 7, 2006, TELC sent its clients’ demand letter to EnerVest, LDEQ, and EPA, 
providing notice that EnerVest was violating the federal hazardous waste law by allowing 
mercury to leak from its meters into the environment. See Notice of Endangerment and Intent to 
File Suit, dated Dec. 7, 2006, Complaint Ex. A, Gulf Restoration Network et al. v. EnerVest 
Operating, L.L.C., No. 07-cv-00817 (W.D. La. May 9, 2007), ECF No. 1. After receiving 
TELC’s demand letter, EnerVest proposed a cleanup agreement to LDEQ. See Letter from 
 2/1/2011 2:50:49 PM 
2011] CAN PREEMPTION PROTECT PUBLIC PARTICIPATION? 1143 
D. Preemption of De-Lawyering Laws Is Consistent  
with the Cooperative Federalist Scheme 
Congress enacted modern antipollution laws against the backdrop 
of an historical tradition of state primacy in regulation to protect 
public health and safety.181 Congress only stepped in to require an 
extensive federal response to environmental degradation after years of 
frustration with states’ failure to grapple effectively with the 
problem.182 Even while federalizing many of the basic policy 
                                                                                                                 
 
Jimmy Pardue, EnerVest District Manager, to Keith Casanova, LDEQ Administrator Remedial 
Services (Feb. 21, 2007) (available as LDEQ EDMS Doc. No. 5691828). 
Adley’s claims that a cleanup “was completed in accordance with law” and that: “None-
the-less, TELC filed a law suit against the company.” Adley, supra note 80 at 34. These 
statements are not true. There was no “completed” cleanup in place when TELC’s clients filed 
suit on May 9, 2007. See Complaint, Gulf Restoration Network v. EnerVest Operating, L.L.C., 
No. 07-cv-00817 (W.D. La. May 9, 2007), ECF No. 1. Indeed, it was not until the next January 
that EnerVest and LDEQ even agreed on a cleanup plan. That plan would have allowed 
EnerVest more than 9 years to replace its leaking mercury meters and to clean up contaminated 
sites. See Cooperative Agreement for Area of Concern Remediation of Former Mercury Meter 
Measuring Stations in Louisiana, LDEQ Agency Interest No. 149272 (Jan. 3, 2008) (available 
as LDEQ EDEMS Doc. No. 6017036) (setting a cleanup standard of 2.3 parts per million 
(ppm)).  
After negotiations, TELC’s clients settled with EnerVest. That settlement tightened the 
cleanup standard by more than one third (to 1.5 ppm) generally and by more than one half (to 1 
ppm) in sites located near wetlands. It also speeded up replacement of the mercury meters. See 
Stipulated Judgment, Gulf Restoration Network v. EnerVest Operating, L.L.C., No. 07-cv-
00817 (W.D. La. July 2, 2009), ECF No. 41, ¶¶ 11, 15, 28. EnerVest’s Bill Page confirmed in 
his testimony that the settlement resulted in “more stringent soil remediation standards” and “the 
program was accelerated.” La. Sen. Hearing Video, supra note 39 (Page claimed that the 
standards were only “a little” more stringent). The facts, therefore, show that far from “running 
up legal costs needlessly,” as Adley charges, TELC’s clients achieved significant results by 
reducing the concentrations of a neurotoxin in Louisiana’s environment and speeding up the 
replacement of the meters that were leaking mercury. 
Bill Page also testified that TELC insisted on payment of attorney fees as a condition of 
the settlement. Id. This is presumably why Adley accuses TELC of “legalized extortion.” Adley, 
supra note 80 at 34. But both Page’s testimony on this point and Adley’s accusation are wrong. 
TELC proposed to leave the attorney-fees issue open—for the parties or the court to resolve 
after settlement of the merits. See Email from Adam Babich, TELC, to Leonard L. Kilgore, 
counsel for EnerVest Operating, L.L.C. (Mar. 26, 2009, 11:44 a.m. CST) (attaching the 
proposal) (on file with author). It was EnerVest—not TELC—that insisted on resolving the 
attorney-fees issue as part of the settlement. See Email from Leonard L. Kilgore, counsel for 
EnerVest Operating, L.L.C., to Adam Babich, TELC (Mar. 30, 2009, 3:47 p.m. CST) (on file 
with author) (“My client does not want to leave that issue open.”). Further, at the conclusion of 
negotiations, EnerVest agreed that the settlement about which Adley now complains was “fair, 
reasonable and equitable.” See [Proposed] Stipulated Judgment, Gulf Restoration Network v. 
EnerVest Operating, L.L.C., No. 07-cv-00817 at 14 (W.D. La. June 30, 2009), ECF No. 40-2. 
181 See J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 38 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al., eds., 1993) (“Congress was 
concerned about the scope of the commerce clause as a basis for regulation impacting behavior 
of such an individual nature. The Supreme Court’s vindication of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
opened the door for sweeping environmental health and safety regulation.”). 
182 See Train v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975) (describing Congress’ first 
use of environmental cooperative federalism (in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970) as 
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decisions behind modern environmental regulatory programs, 
Congress employed a system of cooperative federalism to preserve at 
least a semblance of state primacy.183 The basic outline of this system 
is that EPA promulgates minimum federal standards and then 
provides funding and oversight for state implementation of those 
standards through EPA-approved state regulatory programs.184 One 
policy justification for this system is that it allows room for state 
variation and creativity within the latitude afforded by federal 
mandates.185 It is fair to ask, therefore, whether Congress’ 
employment of a cooperative federalist scheme in environmental 
programs suggests that courts should be reluctant to find state law 
preempted. 
To some extent, the answer is yes, although how much this adds to 
the presumption against preemption is open to question. When 
interpreting statutes structured to advance cooperative federalism, the 
Supreme Court has “not been reluctant to leave a range of permissible 
choices to the States, at least where the superintending federal agency 
has concluded that such latitude is consistent with the statute’s 
aims.”186 Similarly, the Court has held that “[w]here coordinate state 
and federal efforts exist within a complementary administrative 
framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for 
federal pre-emption becomes a less persuasive one.”187 But a bill like 
Senator Adley’s is not part of a “pursuit of common purposes.” 
Senate Bill 549’s backers did not purport to find a creative approach 
to achievement of a federal statutory purpose. Instead, they openly 
                                                                                                                 
 
Congress “taking a stick to the States” as a reaction to the states’ disappointing response to 
“increasing congressional concern with air pollution”). 
183 See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1516, 1532 (1995) (“Cooperative federalism holds the promise of allowing the 
states continued primacy and flexibility in their traditional realms of protecting public health 
and welfare, while ensuring that protections for all citizens meet minimum federal standards.”). 
184 See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against 
Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens Part Two: Statutory 
Preclusions on EPA Enforcement, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (“Beginning with the 
CAA, Congress modeled complicated ‘cooperative federalism’ constructs as the bedrock of its 
environmental programs. It envisioned that state laws, approved by EPA and meeting federal 
requirements, would be the cores of the statutes.”). 
185 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic 
Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 184 (2006) (noting that federal 
preemption can leave “the responsibility of generating policy ideas to the federal government 
alone”). 
186 Wis. Dept. of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002). 
187 N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973). 
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advertised the bill for what it was: an attempt to limit the ability of 
ordinary citizens to mount legal challenges to environmental 
permits.188 The fact that Congress’ mandates for public participation 
are part of a cooperative federalist regulatory scheme should not give 
states license to enact legislation in direct conflict with them.189 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean 
Water Act each provide a direct mandate for public participation and 
also a command that EPA promulgate regulations “specifying 
minimum guidelines for public participation.”190 EPA uses these 
regulations as guidance and to determine whether to approve state 
proposals for state implementation (and federal funding) of water 
discharge and hazardous waste programs.191 A fair question, then, is 
whether Congress intended its mandates for public participation to be 
subsumed in this approval process or whether they have independent 
force. For two reasons, the answer must be that the mandates have 
direct preemptive force. 
First, EPA’s regulations do not fully implement Congress’ 
mandates for public participation because of the regulations’ limited 
scope. EPA can only enforce the regulations within the context of 
EPA-approved state regulatory programs.192 The regulations do not 
                                                                                                                 
188 Blum, Law Clinics Focus of Bill, supra note 54, at 8A. 
189 The U.S. Supreme Court “has long made clear that federal law is as much the law of the 
several States as are the laws passed by their legislatures.” Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 
2114 (2009). 
190 See supra note 8 (quoting Clean Water Act § 101(e)); supra note 133 (quoting 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7004(b)(1)). 
191 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 25 (2010) (regulations applicable to programs under the Clean Water, 
Resource Conservation and Recovery, and Safe Drinking Water Acts); id. § 123.30 (Clean 
Water Act regulations); id. § 271.14(x),(y),(z),(aa) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
regulations); see also Akiak Native Cmty. v. EPA, 625 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The 
EPA interprets [40 C.F.R. § 123.30] to offer a safe harbor for what is permissible . . . . If judicial 
review of a permitting decision by the State is less than what would be available in federal 
court, the EPA argues that the agency can exercise its discretion in determining whether the 
state program meets the general standard.”). In Akiak Native Community, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld EPA approval of Alaska’s Clean Water Act discharge regulatory program despite the 
fact that Alaska employs a ‘loser-pays’ rule about attorney fees. See id. at 1167–70. But “Alaska 
provided, as part of its application to assume control over the NPDES program, a declaration 
that it will not seek attorney’s fees from permit challengers who pursue unsuccessful appeals 
‘unless the appeal was frivolous or brought simply for purposes of delay.’” Id. at 1170. 
192 Environmental laws allow EPA to withdraw approval of state programs that stop 
meeting minimum federal criteria, including programs that fail to comply with public 
participation requirements. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3) (2006) (Clean Water Act); 40 
C.F.R. § 123.63(a)(2)(iii) (2010) (Clean Water Act regulations); 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (2006) 
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 40 C.F.R. § 271.22(a)(2)(iii) (2010) (Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act regulations); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(H), (c)(1) & (k)(5), 7509, 
7661a(i) (2006) (Clean Air Act); 40 C.F.R. § 52.31 (2010) (Clean Air Act regulations). Further, 
some regulations require that EPA “respond in writing to any petition to commence withdrawal 
proceedings.” Id. § 123.64(b)(1) (Clean Water Act regulations); id. § 271.23(b)(1) (Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act regulations). Also, environmental laws often give EPA 
authority to block illegally issued state permits. See, e.g., id. § 271.19(e) (providing EPA 
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prevent states from obstructing public participation in federal 
administrative proceedings. And Senate Bill 549 would have 
forbidden clinics from helping clients file a petition or suit “against a 
government agency”—language that includes federal agencies.193 
Thus, even EPA withdrawal of the state’s authority to implement 
federal environmental regulatory programs would not have stopped 
this de-lawyering bill—if enacted and upheld—from obstructing 
Congress’ goal of enhanced public participation.194  
Second, Congress crafted mandates for public participation using 
“the language of command”—putting them in terms of what EPA and 
the states “shall” do—not merely as a preface to an authorization to 
promulgate rules.195 In construing a statute, courts “give effect, if 
possible, to every word Congress used.”196 There is no way to give 
effect to language that says “[p]ublic participation . . . shall be 
provided for, encouraged, and assisted by . . . the States,”197 without 
recognizing that states may not lawfully obstruct public participation. 
E. Mandates for Public Participation Are  
Within Congress’ Authority 
When Congress uses the word “shall” to shape state regulatory 
programs, it is natural to ask whether Congress has respected the 
bounds of the Tenth Amendment. Tenth Amendment doctrine 
prohibits Congress from “commandee[ring] the legislative processes 
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a 
federal regulatory program.”198 Thus, if Congress’ mandates that 
states encourage public participation were simple commands that 
states use their legislative and administrative processes to advance 
federal policy, the constitutionality of the statutes would be shaky at 
best. But in the context of the cooperative federalism system that the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act 
employ, the seemingly mandatory “shall” language does not 
                                                                                                                 
 
authority to “terminate” an illegal state-issued hazardous-waste permit); Clean Water Act 
§ 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (2006) (providing EPA authority to block illegal permits); 
Clean Air Act § 505(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b) (2006) (same).  
193 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (quoting Senate Bill 549). 
194 See supra note 192 (providing citations to regulations governing EPA withdrawal of 
states’ authority to implement federal programs).  
195 See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) (“The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily the 
language of command.” (quoting Anderson v. Yungkao, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
196 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
197 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(1) (2006). 
198 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).  
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commandeer anything.199 As explained below, neither law offends the 
Tenth Amendment. 
Like most environmental laws, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act make state participation in the 
regulatory process strictly voluntary.200 Most modern antipollution 
laws give states a choice: One option is to run environmental 
programs that implement minimum federal standards and to receive 
federal funding for those programs.201 This is why congressional 
mandates for public participation refer to programs “under this 
chapter,” i.e., programs that implement federal law, whether it is the 
states or EPA that run those programs.202 The states’ other option is to 
stand aside and watch EPA run antipollution programs that preempt 
inconsistent state regulations.203 In other words, “if a State . . . simply 
stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the federal 
proposals.”204 This type of scheme—where Congress inspires states to 
advance federal policy with threats of preemption and by attaching 
conditions to related federal benefits—does not offend Tenth 
                                                                                                                 
199 See City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that even if 
Cities’ “permits require them to implement a federal regulatory program, the Cities cannot 
establish a Tenth Amendment violation without demonstrating that they had no other option but 
to regulate according to federal standards”); see also Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 
847 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]hile the federal government may not compel them to do so, it may 
encourage States and municipalities to implement federal regulatory programs. . . . [But] the 
State or municipality must retain ‘the ultimate decision’ as to whether [it] will comply with the 
federal regulatory program.”). 
200 42 U.S.C. § 6926(a) (providing for EPA approval of state applications to apply state 
hazardous waste regulations in lieu of EPA’s program); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006) (providing a 
mechanism for EPA authorization to a state “desiring to administer its own [Clean Water Act 
discharge] permit program”). 
201 States can “largely control the regulatory programs delegated to them” subject to 
“immutable federal standards.” David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: 
The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 
1812 (2008). 
202 See, e.g., Adam Babich, Is RCRA Enforceable by Citizen Suit in States with Authorized 
Hazardous Waste Programs?, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10536, 10537 (1993) (“[The] 
EPA’s approval of a state’s application ‘to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program 
pursuant to this subchapter [Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, subchapter III]’ causes 
state [hazardous waste] requirements to ‘become effective pursuant to this chapter.’” (endnotes 
omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926(b), 6972(a)(1)(A) (2006))). 
203 See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006) (“State[s] . . . may not adopt or enforce any emission 
standard or limitation which is less stringent that the standard or limitation under such [Clean 
Air Act] plan or section.”); id. § 6929 (“[N]o state or political subdivision may impose any 
[hazardous waste regulatory] requirements less stringent than those authorized under this 
subchapter respecting the same matter as governed by such regulations . . . .”); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 
(2006) (“[S]tate[s] . . . may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other 
limitation . . . which is less stringent than [Clean Water Act standards] . . . .”). 
204 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982); see also 
Joseph F. Zimmerman, Preemption in the U.S. Federal System, 23 PUBLIUS, Fall 1993, at 1, 8 
(“A distinction must be drawn between a congressional mandate and a condition-of-aid. . . . A 
condition-of-aid can be avoided by not applying for a grant; in contrast, a mandate cannot be 
avoided.”). 
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Amendment doctrine.205 No matter that “it may be unlikely that the 
States will or easily can abandon regulation of [the activity at issue] 
to avoid [the federal law’s] requirements.”206 Environmental 
cooperative federalism may not be among the gentler forms of 
federal-state interaction, but it is fully consistent with the Tenth 
Amendment. 
IV. ARE ATTORNEY FEES AVAILABLE? 
A Supremacy Clause claim, standing alone, states a federal 
question sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.207 The weight of authority is that the 
Supremacy Clause also creates a private cause of action.208 Whether 
to also include a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a judgment call, 
                                                                                                                 
205 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has the 
authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized 
Congress’ power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal 
standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.”). Further, “‘Congress may 
attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds’” that “bear some relationship to the purpose of 
the federal spending” and where “the recipient of federal funds is a State . . . [these conditions] 
may influence a State’s legislative choices.” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)). 
206 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 767; see also City of Abilene v. EPA, 
325 F.3d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he fact that the alternative is difficult, expensive or 
otherwise unappealing is insufficient to establish a Tenth Amendment violation.”). 
207 See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002) (“We have no 
doubt that federal courts have jurisdiction under § 1331 to entertain such a suit.”); Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983) (“A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief . . . on the 
ground that [state] regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute . . . presents a federal question 
which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.”); Rollins Envtl. 
Servs. (FS), Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The most obvious 
source of federal jurisdiction in this [federal preemption] case is 28 U.S.C. § 1331 . . . .”). 
208 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he [U.S. Supreme] Court has consistently assumed—without comment—that the 
Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action to enjoin implementation of allegedly unlawful 
state legislation.”); Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 334 & 
n.47 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding it to be “well-established” that “there is an implied right of action 
to enjoin state or local regulation that is preempted by a federal statutory or constitutional 
provision”); Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (“A federal 
statutory right or right of action is not required where a party seeks to enjoin the enforcement of 
a regulation on the grounds that the local ordinance is preempted by federal law.”); Wright 
Elec., Inc. v. Minn. State Bd. of Elec., 322 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A] claim under 
the Supremacy Clause that a federal law preempts a state regulation is distinct from a claim for 
enforcement of that federal law.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks)); Burgio & 
Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1006 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]e 
agree with those commentators who have concluded that [t]he best explanation of Ex parte 
Young and its progeny is that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for 
injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or 
laws.” (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But 
see Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Pegues, 904 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir.1990) (finding 
no cause of action because ‘“[t]he Supremacy Clause does not secure rights to individuals’” 
(quoting Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1975))). 
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since it would likely complicate the issues before a court. The 
advantage of such a claim is that plaintiffs who prevail under § 1983 
are eligible for attorney-fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.209 As 
insurance against the chance that a court will dismiss the § 1983 
claim, however, the plaintiff’s complaint should also allege federal-
question jurisdiction created by the Constitution itself.210  
To make a case under § 1983, “a plaintiff must first show a 
violation of the Constitution or of federal law, and then show that the 
violation was committed by someone acting under color of state 
law.”211 Somewhat confusingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled 
that “the Supremacy Clause, of its own force, does not create rights 
enforceable under § 1983.”212 Instead, that clause “‘secure[s] federal 
rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with 
state law.’”213 A violation of the statute with preemptive effect is not, 
however, required for § 1983 to apply. This is because § 1983 
“speaks in terms of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities,’ not violations 
of federal law.”214 In other words, although plaintiffs cannot use 
§ 1983 to enforce the Supremacy Clause in the abstract, they can use 
§ 1983 to enforce that clause’s effect of preventing conflicting state 
laws from compromising their enjoyment of rights under federal 
law.215 
Section 1983 is available to enforce rights, i.e., “obligations 
‘sufficiently specific and definite’ to be within ‘the competence of the 
judiciary to enforce’ [and which are] intended to benefit the putative 
plaintiff.”216 Congress’ commands that EPA and the states provide 
                                                                                                                 
209 In contrast, “[a]ttorney’s fees are not available in an action under the Supremacy 
Clause.” United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 841 (9th Cir. 2008). 
210 See Chamber of Commerce. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 756 n.13 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that because the plaintiffs “have a valid right of action under the Supremacy Clause, 
we need not address the [defendant’s] § 1983 argument” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
211 Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 252–53 (5th Cir. 2005). 
212 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989) (footnote 
omitted). 
213 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 450 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Golden 
State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 107); see also Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 
F.3d 316, 348–49 n.12 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As the holder of [federal] licenses [with which a state 
law would interfere], [the plaintiff] has standing to assert its Supremacy Clause claim under 
§ 1983.”). 
214 Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106. 
215 See id. at 112 (“The violation of a federal right that has been found to be implicit in a 
statute’s language and structure is as much a ‘direct violation’ of a right as is the violation of a 
right that is clearly set forth in the text of the statute.”); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 
(1994) (“Having determined that the Commissioner’s policy is in fact pre-empted by federal 
law, we find strong support in our precedents for the position taken by both courts below that 
Livadas is entitled to seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”). 
216 Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 108 (citation omitted) (quoting Wright v. 
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 (1987). The U.S. Supreme Court 
has “reject[ed] the notion that [its] cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred 
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for, encourage, and assist the public’s participation should be 
“specific and definite” enough to clear this hurdle. The statutory 
language is not “so manifestly precatory that it could not fairly be 
read” as binding.217 Further, Congress must have intended these 
mandates to benefit, at least in part, members of the public who wish 
to participate.218 
Section 1983 is not available if its use would bypass “remedial 
devices provided in a particular Act” when those devices are 
“sufficiently comprehensive.”219 In the National Sea Clammers Ass’n 
case, the Court ruled that the Clean Water Act and Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act’s comprehensive enforcement 
mechanisms—including citizen-suit provisions—barred the plaintiffs 
from using § 1983 to sue for damages from water pollution.220 But a 
challenge to de-lawyering legislation would not be a lawsuit about 
pollution; instead, it would enforce the right, secured by the 
Supremacy Clause, to participate in implementation of federal law 
without interference from conflicting state action.221 There is no 
                                                                                                                 
 
right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 
283 (2002). A court, therefore, “must first determine whether Congress intended to create a 
federal right.” Id. “For a statute to create such private rights, its text must be ‘phrased in terms 
of the persons benefited.’” Id. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 
(1979)). But § 1983 plaintiffs “do not have the burden of showing an intent to create a private 
remedy because § 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by 
federal statutes.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Cal. State Foster Parent Ass’n v. Wagner, 624 
F.3d 974, 978–79 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Congress’s intent to benefit the plaintiff must be 
‘unambiguous.’” (quoting Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283)). 
217 Livadas, 512 U.S. at 132. 
218 See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 503 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Congress 
clearly intended to guarantee the public a meaningful role in the implementation of the Clean 
Water Act.”); Costle v. Pacific Legal Found., 445 U.S. 198, 216 (1980) (noting that the Clean 
Water Act’s legislative history provides that “‘[t]he public must have a genuine opportunity to 
speak on the issue of protection of its waters’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 72 (1971), 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1972, p. 3668) (alteration in original)). 
219 Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) 
(“When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they 
may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.”). 
220 Id. at 20–21. Courts are unlikely, however, to hold that citizen-suit provisions provide a 
remedy for state violations of a mandate for public participation. See, e.g., Clean Water Act 
§ 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006) (authorizing citizen suits to enforce “an effluent standard 
or limitation” and EPA duties that are not discretionary); see also Holy Cross Neighborhood 
Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineering, No. 03–370, 2011 WL 1226237, at *5 (E.C. La. Mar. 
29, 2011) (reviewing case law that citizen suits are “a means by which private parties may 
enforce the substantive provisions of [environmental laws] against regulated parties” but not “an 
alternative avenue of judicial review of the . . . implementation of the statute.” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
221 See Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106–09 (allowing a § 1983 claim about 
preemption under the National Labor Relations Act, which has no such “comprehensive 
enforcement scheme” with respect to “state interference with federally protected labor rights” 
and noting that “Section 1983 speaks in terms of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities,’ not 
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reason to believe that Congress intended federal environmental laws 
to provide a remedy for violation of this right.222 Accordingly, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 may be available to fight de-lawyering laws. 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b): “the court, in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney's fee” in an action to enforce § 1983. Despite the 
discretionary tone of this language, prevailing plaintiffs generally 
receive a fee award if they achieve “some degree of success on the 
merits” beyond “trivial . . . or purely procedural” success.223 On the 
other hand, prevailing defendants generally cannot recover fees 
“unless a court finds that [the plaintiffs’] claim was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate 
after it clearly became so.”224 Accordingly, plaintiffs threatened by 
                                                                                                                 
 
violations of federal law”). In Golden State Transit Corp., the Court noted, “[w]e do not lightly 
conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for the deprivation 
of a federally secured right.” Id. at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright, 479 
U.S. at 423–24). “The burden to demonstrate that Congress has expressly withdrawn the remedy 
is on the defendant.” Id. Specifically, the defendant must show that allowing a § 1983 action 
“would be inconsistent with Congress’ carefully tailored scheme.” Id. (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). But see Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of L.A., 584 
F.3d 1232, 1237 (9th Cir. 2009) (approvingly citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Williams, 
810 F.2d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 1985), which held—pre-Golden State Transit Corp.—“preemption 
of state law under the Supremacy Clause—at least if based on federal occupation of the field or 
conflict with federal goals—will not support an action under § 1983.”). 
222 See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 129 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2009) 
(In cases alleging a constitutional violation, “lack of congressional intent” to preclude § 1983 
claims “may be inferred from a comparison of the rights and protections of the statute and those 
existing under the Constitution. Where the contours of such rights and protections diverge in 
significant ways, it is not likely that Congress intended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing 
constitutional rights.”); Charvat v. E. Ohio Reg’l Wastewater Auth., 246 F.3d 607, 615 (6th Cir. 
2001) (“In sum, the defendants have failed to prove that Congress intended for the 
whistleblower provisions of the CWA and SDWA [i.e., the Safe Drinking Water Act] to 
preclude the enforcement of constitutional rights through § 1983.”). But see City of Rancho 
Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005) (noting that “the existence of a more 
restrictive private remedy for statutory violations has been the dividing line between those cases 
in which we have held that an action would lie under § 1983 and those in which we have held 
that it would not” and that “in all of the cases in which we have held that § 1983 is available for 
violation of a federal statute, we have emphasized that the statute at issue . . . did not provide a 
private judicial remedy . . . for the rights violated”); cf. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002) (“‘The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should 
not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others.’” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967))). 
223 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 n.9 (1983); Tex. State Teachers 
Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (explaining that a prevailing party 
is one who “changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant” and is awarded “‘at 
least some relief on the merits of his claim’” (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 
(1987))); Saint John’s Organic Farm v. Gem Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist., 574 F.3d 1054, 
1063–64 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a “court’s discretion to deny a fee award to a prevailing 
plaintiff is narrow” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
224 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); see also Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983) (“A prevailing defendant may recover an attorney’s fee 
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unconstitutional de-lawyering laws who prevail under § 1983 should 
be able to recover their attorney fees from the offending state actor. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Society is unlikely to develop a consensus soon about the 
appropriate balance between environmental protection and other 
goals. So disputes about environmental issues will likely continue to 
frustrate members of the regulated community, environmentalists, 
grass roots activists, and their lawyers. We will sometimes become 
angry with one another. Nonetheless, at bottom, the effort to protect 
communities from environmental degradation is a struggle to 
persuade our fellow citizens, not to defeat some “other” side. We are 
engaged in a dialogue—not warfare—and if we conduct that dialogue 
well, we will achieve results that should be viewed as legitimate. 
Conducting the dialogue well means allowing all sides to participate, 
in accordance with our laws and with respect for each other and for 
U.S. legal traditions. 
De-lawyering is not dialogue. It is an attempt to end discussion by 
blocking people’s ability to use laws that entitle them to a voice in 
decisions that affect their lives. Those interested in upholding U.S. 
legal traditions and the rule of law should join in stripping any veneer 
of respectability from de-lawyering efforts. We should hew to the 
example of John Adams—one of the founders of the U.S. experiment 
in government “by the people”225—who stepped up to ensure that 
even British soldiers who participated in the Boston massacre were 
afforded legal representation without regard for the inevitable 
“clamor and popular suspicions and prejudices.”226 In the United 
States of America, reputable members of society seek to advance their 
interests under the law—not by “kneecapping” those who provide 
legal representation to people they disagree with. 
Congress’ mandates for public participation in environmental 
implementation are the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause should therefore preempt conflicting state de-
lawyering laws and provide one tool for keeping the public dialogue 
about environmental protection going.  
 
                                                                                                                 
 
only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.”). 
225 LINCOLN, supra note 21, at 536. 
226 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 66 (2001) (“As a lawyer, his duty was clear. 
That he would be hazarding his hard-earned reputation and, in his words, ‘incurring a clamor 
and popular suspicions and prejudices’ against him, was obvious . . . .”).  
